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The Arrow of the Law
INTRODUCTION
Was the Constitution an exercise in building a social system
or a social structure? To some that question may pose a distinc-
tion without a difference, but emerging theories regarding the
evolution of adaptive systems suggest important differences be-
tween the behavioral qualities that define society as a dynamical
operating system versus the characteristics of society as a fin-
ished structure. One can scour the Constitution and find no
indication of how society is supposed to look in the end or at
any particular point along its path. By contrast, today's society
seems fixated not on the sociolegal system, but on the TV-screen
picture of what society should look like at any moment. Our
heavily-governed society appears willing at every turn to subvert
our constitutional system by twisting, jiggling, bending, and ad-
justing the picture of the moment to its liking. Alas, every time
society thinks it has tuned the picture into focus, when it sits
down to enjoy the program, the static and distortion have re-
turned. The distinction between the mechanisms that move
society along its path and the vision of how society should look
at any instant goes to the very core of legal theory.
This Article uses tools from the emerging field of complexity
theory to explore the role law plays in the evolution of the
sociolegal system and the way in which the use of law to "tune"
the picture of modern society has contributed to the increasing
fragility of that system. Adaptive systems, which by their nature
are generally nonlinear, dynamical, and complex in their behav-
ior,1 are the subject matter of complexity theory.2 We contend
A system exists whenever two or more agents interact. The system is described as
linear when the relationship of the agents' interactions can be described in strictly propor-
tional terms (e.g., y = 2x + 3z), meaning that "we can get a value for the whole by adding
up the value of its parts." JOHN HOLLAND, HIDDEN ORDER 15 (1995). For example, the fuel
consumption of a plane might depend on the plane's velocity, altitude, size, and other vari-
ables operating in a linear relationship. See P.G. DRAZiN, NONINEAR SYSTEMS 1 (1992).
Many systems, however, are nonlinear in that the relationships of the agents represent "a
feedback loop in which the output of an element is not proportional to its input." Id. at 1-
2. Such a nonlinear system is considered dynamical if the agents' relationships evolve with
time or with some variable like time. See id. at 1. The classic example of a nonlinear system
is the relationship between a predator population and its prey. See HoLIAND, supra, at 16-
18. The population of either over time depends on the population of the other over time.
See id. Moreover, the system relationships may progress through different transient states
and ultimately into an enduring, steady-state relationship over time. See id. The sociolegal
1997]
HeinOnline  -- 30 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 407 1996-1997
University of Cali[ornia, Davis [Vol. 30:405
that the sociolegal system exhibits the qualities of adaptive sys-
tems, and that our understanding of its evolutionary process and
direction can be improved through application of complexity
theory.
We begin Part I of this Article by using examples from envi-
ronmental law to describe how the basic complexity theory mod-
el of dynamical systems can explain the behavior and evolution
of the sociolegal system.- This leads inevitably to exploration of
system, given its tremendous number of components and constantly changing environmen-
tal conditions, will likely never escape the transient state, but this observation does not
prevent using complexity theory to describe where the sociolegal system is headed.
2 Complexity theory refers to the body of literature and research devoted to studying
and understanding the transient and steady-state behavior of some nonlinear dynamical
systems. Complexity theory thus has been described as "the study of the behavior of macro-
scopic collections of [interacting] units that are endowed with the potential to evolve in
time." PETER CovENEY & ROGER HIGHFIELD, FRONTIERS OF COMPLEXrry 7 (1995). Complexi-
ty theory embraces the more popularized branches of chaos theory and catastrophe theory,
and as such is an overarching field of mathematical analysis of the behavior of nonlinear
dynamical systems. The study of such systems can be quite technical in substance. See, e.g.,
HOLLAND, supra note 1 (explaining nonlinearity of predator-prey relationship). However,
many of the recent and most influential works in the field focus on applications of the
technical theory to real world phenomena, such as biological evolution. See, e.g., JOHN L.
CASTI, COMPLEXIFICATION 94, 210-11, 252-53 (1994) (applying technical systems theory to
insect population dynamics, technological disasters, and water flow); JACK COHEN & IAN
STEWART, THE COLLAPSE OF CHAOS (1994) (applying technical systems to biological, intel-
lectual, and cultural evolution); COMPLEXrY: METAPHORS, MODELS, AND REALITY 185, 245,
287 (George Cowan et al. eds., 1994) (applying technical systems theory to immunology,
brain circuits, and molecular biology); MURRAY GELL-MANN, THE QUARK AND THE JAGUAR
69-70, 246-48, 252 (1994) (applying technical systems theory to biological evolution, repro-
duction, and diversity of ecological communities); BRIAN GOODWIN, How THE LEOPARD
CHANGED I'S SPOTS 187-95 (1994) (applying technical systems theory to origin of life, ant
colonies, and play-like behavior); STUART KAUFFMAN, AT HOME IN THE UNIVERSE 58-61, 74-
80, 245-71 (1995) (applying technical systems theory to organizational development, reac-
tion networks, and homeostasis); KEVIN KELLY, OUT OF CONTROL 86-90 (1994) (applying
technical systems theory to co-evolutionary games).
' We have developed in other articles the basic model of how the sociolegal system
can be portrayed as a complex adaptive system and how the findings of complexity theory
can contribute to an understanding of the mechanics of how that system behaves and
evolves. See generallyJ.B. Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm for the Dynamical Law-nd-Soci-
ety System" A Wake-Up Callfor Legal Reductionism and the Modern Administrative State, 45 DUKE
Lj. 849 (1996) [hereinafter Ruh], Complexity Theory as a Paradigm] (setting forth general
behavioral model); J.B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law. Using Complexity Theoy to Describe the Evolu-
tion of Law and Society and its Practical Implications for Democracy, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1407
(1996) [hereinafter Ruhl, The Fitness of Law] (setting forth general evolutionary model);
Harold J. Ruh], Brief Discussions of. Truth, Axiomatic Systems, the Science of Complexity, Non-Lin-
ear Dynamic Systems, a New Understanding of Entropy, and a New Look at Time's Arrow, as Applied
to Understanding the Structure and Behavior of Our World, Particularly the Origins of Life, and
Other Manifestations of Far from Equilibrium Systems Including the Origins and Risks of Sustained
408
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the "arrow" of sociolegal evolution in our current medium of
American politics - the administrative state. All complex
Positive Economic Growth, and the Origins of Organizational Error in and the Consequent Collapse of
Polities (last modified Jan. 23, 1997) <http://www.connix.com/-hjr/modelOl.htm> [herein-
after Ruhl, Brief Discussions] (providing internet world wide web page with detailed techni-
cal explanations of complexity theory and its potential applications to various social issues).
The subject of this Article is the direction in which those behavioral and evolutionary
mechanics are leading the sociolegal system given its current transient state. Other authors
have described how complexity theory or branches of it help explain how law behaves and
evolves generally. See generally Vincent Di Lorenzo, Legislative Chaos: An Exploratory Study, 12
YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 425, 432-35 (1994) (developing model for legislative decision-making
based on chaos theory); Thomas Earl Geu, The Tao of Jurisprudence: Chaos, Brain Science,
Synchronicity, and the Law, 61 TENN. L. REv. 933, 942-75 (1994) (discussing potential signifi-
cance of chaos and emergence to legal theory); Andrew Hayes, An Introduction to Chaos and
the Law, 60 UMKC L. REv. 751, 764-72 (1992) (discussing chaos theory and its application
to judicial decision making); Mark J. Roe, Chaos and Evolution in Law and Ecnomics, 109
HARV. L. REv. 641 (1996) (modifying classical legal evolutionary model to accommodate
concepts from chaos theory, path dependence and modern evolutionary theory); Robert E.
Scott, Chaos Theory and the Justice Paradox 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 329 (1993) (applying
chaos theory to legal dilemma between "present justice" and "future justice"). Several other
works discuss nonlinear dynamical systems analysis, sometimes very briefly, in specific legal
settings. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Capital Market Theory, Mandatory Disclosure, and Price
Discovery, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 843, 854-71 (1994) (applying chaos theory to capital
market regulation); Lawrence A. Cunningham, From Random Walk to Chaotic Crashes: The
Linear Genealogy of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, 62 GEO. WASH. L REV. 546, 571-608
(1994) (applying chaos theory to capital market regulation); Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role
of Precedent in Constitutional Decisionmaking and Theory, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68, 114 (1991)
(explaining Supreme Court constitutional jurisprudence using, among other mediums,
discussion of chaos theory); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Chaos and the Court, 91 COLUM. L. REV.
110, 113-14 (1991) (explaining Supreme Court constitutional jurisprudence using chaos
theory); William H. Rodgers, Jr., Where Environmental Law and Biology Meet: Of Pandas'
Thumbs, Statutory Sleepers, and Effective Law, 65 U. COLO. L REV. 25, 56-74 (1993) (discussing
chaos theory surfacing in evolutionary biology commentary as metaphor for evolution of
environmental law).
' The term "administrative state" connotes that two conditions exist in the political
structure of the society. First, the political structure is based on a state model rather than a
clan or tribal system. In states, there are more established and legitimated features of terri-
torial organization, differentiation by class and occupation rather than by kinship, monopo-
ly of force, authority to mobilize resources and personnel, and legal jurisdiction. SeeJOSEPH
A. TAINTER, THE COLLAPSE OF COMPLEX SocimES 26-28 (1988). The second condition is
that these features of the state have become highly articulated through a bureaucratic,
rather than feudal, model of organization and distribution of power. See ROGER D. MAS-
TERS, THE NATURE OF PoLrucs 187-203 (1989) (describing development and function of
bureaucracy). Through the rule of law, highly centralized and developed bureaucracies
facilitate the coercion and coordination of behavior needed to support very large societies,
but they also exact a resource cost on the society. The subject of this Article is what hap-
pens when this administrative state - in particular, the legal structure within which it is
embedded - becomes so large that the costs associated with its further growth exceed the
benefits conferred on the society.
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dynamical systems have an arrow of irreversibility; their evolu-
tionary processes cannot be put into reverse so as to re-create
the past. Law shares this property. It unfolds as part of a
sociolegal system that could no more return to a prior point on
its path than could the weather be reversed. Hence the weather
and other complex dynamical systems, such as ecosystems, econ-
omies, brains, and, we posit, the law, all have their directional
arrows. The challenge is determining the directions in which the
arrows point.
To learn more about the arrow of law, we then delve more
deeply into the findings emerging from applications of the com-
plexity theory model in two diverse but converging fields. First,
we examine the archaeological research dealing with the col-
lapse of organized, governed, hierarchical, centralized, produc-
tive societies - societies operating through highly developed
social structures. Work in this field, particularly that of Joseph
Tainter,5 has revealed how societies increase their structural
complexity to confront internal and external sources of stress.
As any one component of society (e.g., the economy) becomes
more structured, other components (e.g., communications) may
also have to become more structured simply to coexist with the
first component. In this way, the relationships between compo-
nents of this complex social structure begin to display the com-
plex behavior generally associated with nonlinear dynamical
systems.
At a point along the curve of investment in more social struc-
ture, a society's further investment leads to decreasing marginal
benefits in terms of promoting adaptive social behavior. The
historical record evidences that when this point is reached, the
social system usually experiences rapid deconstruction. We ex-
tend Tainter's theories explaining why this collapse of social
structure occurs to include law as a factor that contributes to
increasing social structure and its decreasing benefits. The ad-
ministrative state's mistaken premise has been that increasing
the complexity of sociolegal structure leads inexorably to an in-
crease in the adaptability with which the sociolegal system oper-
ates and evolves.6 We argue that the opposite is true.
See TAINTER, supra note 4, at 127-92 (explaining relationship between complexity and
collapse).
' Unfortunately, "complex" is the best term to use to describe both the structure and
410 [Vol. 30:405
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Second, we discuss theories of technology, in particular those
of Stuart Kauffman 7 and Edward Tenner.8 These theories dem-
onstrate the nonlinearity of technological advancement and the
potential for social vulnerability that accompanies increasingly
advanced and interrelated technology systems. The technological
apparatus of modem developed nations, though a source of
great problem-solving power, is also a source of social fragility as
ever smaller "bugs" in the technology can lead to ever larger
dislocations in society. Eventually, no disruption is less than
critical to the system. Analogizing from those findings to the
legal system and the ever-expanding volume, intricacy, and inter-
relatedness of laws, we explore the potential for failure of the
adaptiveness of legal institutions.
The discussion of complexity theory and its use in the fields
of archaeology and technology reveals three overarching themes.
First, evolving dynamical social systems tend towards increasing
use of complex structures to solve problems posed both from
within the system and from the outside environment. Second,
although complex structures initially enhance complex, adaptive
behavior in society, with increasing investment in structural com-
plexity, a system eventually begins to experience diminishing
returns in terms of that investment's contribution to long-term
sustainability of the system behavior. Third, at the point where
the cost of investing further in complex structures exceeds the
problem-solving benefits, the system becomes vulnerable to col-
lapsing into a simpler mode of behavior. This collapse may be
its sole remaining survival response to stress. Without some limit-
ing force on the tendency of a dynamical social system to in-
crease its structural complexity as its principal response to
the behavior of many nonlinear dynamical systems. When referring to structure, complexity
generally means many system components, complicated organizations, intricate details, and
so on. When referring to behavior, complexity generally is associated with adaptive and
robust sustainability of the system. The distinction is crucial for, as we show herein, a sim-
ply structured system could behave complexly, and a complexly structured system could
behave simply. See generally infra text accompanying notes 23-42 (discussing complexity of
systems and behavior). Hence we are left with no choice but to distinguish carefully in our
two uses of the term "complex" throughout this Article and to ask the reader to keep the
distinction in mind.
I See KAUFFMAN, supra note 2.
8 See EDWARD TENNER, WHY THINGS BITE BAcK (1996).
19971
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system stress, the system will become increasingly susceptible to
behavioral failure.
In Part II of the Article, we meld this lesson from complexity
theory into a model of the "arrow of law" in the complexly
structured administrative state. As the archaeological record
demonstrates, states did not emerge as a form of social structure
until about six thousand years ago. Administrative forms of state
structure are even more recent - about three thousand years
old. Administrative states as heavily endowed with centralized
bureaucracy, regulation, litigation, and management as are many
modem societies are a phenomenon of only the past few centu-
ries. The highly structured form of the modem administrative
state is thus an unprecedented development in history and the
pinnacle of the burgeoning of law and its institutions.9
Is the modem administrative state immune to the features of
dynamical systems revealed by complexity theory? We believe
not. Rather, we posit that the administrative state, in the ab-
sence of some limiting force, may reach a point after which it
enters a cycle leading towards diminishing returns on investment
in law and increasing vulnerability to behavioral collapse of the
sociolegal system. That cycle has five steps: (1) society's effort to
create predictable, stable, picture-perfect sociolegal outcomes
leads it to rely increasingly on new and more interrelated laws
to fine tune its picture at the moment; (2) which leads to in-
creasing stratification of subgroups in society as each new law
produces its unique sets of "winners" and "losers" in terms of
economic and social impact of those laws; (3) which leads to
increasing numbers of subgroups and decreasing cross-member-
ship between subgroups as members of society increasingly de-
fine themselves according to highly personal sets of outcomes
under the vast array of laws; (4) which leads to increasing in-
equality in society as the spectrum of possible outcomes broad-
ens and people are distributed widely across that spectrum; (5)
which, of course, is inconsistent with society's idealized picture
' The evolutionary arrow of this form of political organization is unmistakable. All
form and manner of the management and resolution of social issues is channeled through
the administrative state, leading to an ever-increasing complexity of sociolegal structure.
The rule of law, in other words, only increases in complexity and in the resources it de-
mands of society for its support.
412 [Vol. 30:405
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of how it should be structured and thus leads the administrative
state to produce more new laws, restarting the cycle. Ironically,
new and supposedly improved laws, the fundamental weapon the
administrative state uses to weed out inequality and other social
maladaptations, fuel yet more inequalities and maladaptations.
Once the sociolegal system enters this cycle, the arrow of law
does not point in a promising direction. The legal system even-
tually becomes part of the overall problem of diminishing re-
turns on investment in sociolegal structure, thereby contributing
fundamentally to society's increasing vulnerability to sociolegal
instability. Left to its own devices, the administrative state has
not demonstrated a propensity to correct the behavior that is
the root of the problem. Rather, it doles out new and increas-
ingly complicated laws, and creates ever more legal institutions
to combat the social defects it spawned from the previous gener-
ation of laws. With each generation of increased legal structure,
the administrative state becomes more insular, less subject to
change, and thus even more committed to the direction indicat-
ed by the arrow of law. At some point the complexly structured
administrative state ceases to be a problem-solving mechanism
and becomes the problem.
In Part III of the Article, we offer two maxims that may be
able to break the sociolegal system out of this cycle before be-
havioral collapse is inevitable. The first maxim is obvious -
make less law. Its goal is simply to place a check on the tenden-
cy of society to increase legal structure. Among the various so-
cial institutions that can be used to address perceived problems,
law should be used only when it offers the solution with the
least potential to increase social complexity. To fulfill that goal,
we explore several examples of how the modem administrative
state's law-making approach and philosophy could be reconfig-
ured to suppress the tendency to increase the legal structure's
complexity, unless doing so is absolutely necessary.
The second maxim is more subtle - for any new laws that
pass the necessity test of the first maxim, design them to mini-
mize the number of and disparity between winners and losers.
For example, we show how proposals for increased attention to
cost-benefit analysis in law might run afoul of this maxim if not
properly designed. The goal here is to decrease the social in-
equality and heterogeneity caused by legal institutions.
1997]
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To be sure, these two requirements for new laws - one a
gateway test and the other a design standard - may be just the
beginning of how the system, rather than the picture, must be
redesigned to ensure lasting sociolegal adaptiveness. We are not
the first to propose measures on this scale.1" But we believe we
offer a new theoretical and practical basis for demonstrating
that, unless the administrative state takes these steps, it may
someday find itself as fodder for a future complexity theory
study of how the arrow of law can be aimed foolishly towards
the point of no return.
I. WHY LAw'S PATH HAS AN ARROW - DESCRIBING
LAW AS A COMPLEX ADAPTIVE SYSTEM
Oliver Wendell Holmes described change in law as following a
"path" rather than some utterly random process." His aim was
to develop a theoretical understanding of law that would allow
legal change to take place "with conscious articulate reference to
the end in view."12 Holmes recognized, however, that as a prac-
tical matter the path of the future was dictated largely by tradi-
tions and incremental historical development along the path of
the past. 3  Many scholars today have expanded Holmes's
"0 One of the more influential commentaries to emerge in recent years regarding the
direction of the modern administrative state is Philip K. Howard's somewhat rambling,
largely anecdotally-based manifesto. Howard's work focuses on the symptoms of centralized,
rationalized, bureaucratized government in the United States. See PHILp L HOWARD, THE
DEATH OF COMMON SENSE (1994) (arguing for minimal role of government and for more
flexible, streamlined administrative law process). Although we point out in this Article
when we share in some of Howard's diagnoses, his analysis does not purport to offer a
model for evaluating underlying systemic conditions or proposed remedies. His book, how-
ever, is invaluable for its collection of human interest stories of the manifestations of the
phenomena we discuss herein. See infra Part II.A-B (discussing complexity problem in mod-
em administrative state). Howard also demonstrates that one does not really need to use
complexity theory, or any other fancy model of law and society, to sense that something is
wrong with the system. See HowARD, supra, at 22-29 (illustrating crushing complexity of
legal bureaucracy).
" See O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L REV. 457, 457-58 (1897) (arguing
that development of law is not random but occurs as logical outgrowth of previously formu-
lated legal principles).
" Id. at 469.
" See id. at 468-69. We would credit Holmes for forging the idea that where law is
depends on all the prior points where law has been. However, we show herein why
Holmes's effort to construct a legal theory based on some vision of an end point of law was
misguided. See infra text accompanying notes 15-18 (suggesting that law moves along path
414
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depiction of the path of law. They describe changes in law as
being "path dependent" in that, at any moment, law's position
along its path of change is the result of many prior choices of
direction at forks along the way. 4 When society chooses one of
several possible branches at each decision node - for example,
ban guns or don't ban guns - the possibility of evolving along
the other branches is necessarily foregone. Path dependence
theory thus adds to Holmes's path metaphor the variable of
human selection of alternate paths and a deeper understanding
of the consequences of that choice.
But path models of change in law fail to convey an essential
characteristic of the process - law can only move in one direc-
tion along its path of change. The footsteps law leaves behind as
it moves along its path do not simply rest unchanged, waiting
for society to retrace its steps if it decides not to venture further
down the chosen path. 5 Surely this is obvious to anyone who
thinks about the problem. Consider, for example, the era of
Prohibition ushered in with the Eighteenth Amendment 6 and
ended by the Twenty-First Amendment. 7 This is the classic ex-
ample of American society choosing one branch of the path of
law and later, regretting the decision, trying to reverse direction
and choose an alternate branch. Society's progress between
those two decision points had transformed the path of law forev-
er. Society could not simply return to the first decision node,
that can never be retraced).
For example, in his discussion of path dependence theory, Professor Mark Roe ex-
amines how decisions made in the past commit a system to certain paths, thus limiting
other options, perhaps even irreversibly. See Roe, supra note 3, at 643-44 (analogizing path
dependency to winding, present-day road that tracks fur trader's trail from past). As Roe
explains,
[t]oday's road, dependent on the path taken by the trader decades ago, is not
the one that the authorities would lay down if they were choosing their road
today. But society, having invested in the path itself and in the resources along-
side the path, is better off keeping the winding road on its current path than
paying to build another.
Id. at 643.
" Hence, despite the analogy path dependence theory offers for decisions about the
future, we show herein why society cannot "consciously re-engineer our.., system...
by... returning to a branch node and going down another path." Id. at 665.
See U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII (repealed 1933).
See U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
1997] 415
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pick a different branch of the path, and skip merrily along the
new way as if nothing had happened." When society wants to
change the direction of law, it can make a sharp turn towards
the path that might have been, but it can not retrace its steps.
The path of the law is a one-way street; it has an arrow.
To create a coherent model of law's process of change, we
turn to complexity theory and its study of adaptive systems. All
such systems move along a path of change in a manner that is
inherently dissipative in nature. 9 The weather, for example,
unfolds continuously without ever repeating itself exactly. When
the sun comes out after a storm, it does not replicate a prior
sunny day. There is no reverse switch on such adaptive systems.
We posit that law can be usefully modeled as a complex adap-
tive system. Further, the general model of change offered by
complexity theory and insights emerging in specific applications
of that model in other disciplines can greatly enhance our un-
derstanding of the arrow embedded in law.
If anything, Prohibition solidified organized crime in the United States and spread
the culture and consumption of alcohol more widely through the population, two effects
which could not easily be undone simply by repealing the Eighteenth Amendment. See
gmferay SEAN DENNIS CASHMAN, PROHIBTION: THE LIE OF THE LAND (1981) (chronicling
history and social consequences of Prohibition).
'" The Nobel laureate Ilya Prigogine defined a dissipative system as one for which the
driving force is the nonequilibrium flux of matter and energy through the system that
increases order and sustainability in the system. See KAuFFMAN, supra note 2, at 21. Because
these systems experience nonequilibrium in terms of input, they necessarily cannot be
.reversed" so as to replicate the conditions of the system at a prior point in time. See id. An
important focus of complexity theory research is whether dissipative systems can overcome
the commonly posited drive towards disorder that many theorists believed to be associated
with maximum entropy in systems that are in final thermodynamic equilibrium. In other
words, can disorder on the input side lead to order on the output side, and if so, how? See
id. 20-21 (explaining organization of nonequilibrium structures); infra note 65 (discussing
complexity theory approaches to equilibrium question). Consistent with Prigogine's theo-
rem, we conceive of order in the sociolegal system as being the system's computable com-
ponent (structure) made possible by the axiomatic system we call law. We are concerned in
this Article largely with the relationships in the sociolegal system between the quantity of
this structure, the associated directed use of energy, and the system's consequential behav-
ioral responses. We encourage the reader to explore further the underlying model suggest-
ed by Prigogine's theorem and its possible applications to various sociolegal issues at an
internet world wide web page that contains an article written by Harold J. Ruhl. See Ruhl,
BriefDiscussins, supra note 3 (providing work in progress which uses formal axiomatic sys-
tems model to understand entropy, and thus system evolution, in new way).
HeinOnline  -- 30 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 416 1996-1997
1997] The Arrow of the Law
A. The General Model of Law as a Complex Adaptive System
Complexity theory is about the study of change in systems.
While complexity theory is not the first model for examining
the process of change in systems, it is the first fundamentally
new way of approaching the question of change to emerge in
decades.' Moreover, it has the unique quality of incorporating
significant themes of other major theories of change, such as
Newtonian physics and Darwinian biology, and applying the
unified themes to systems as diverse as the weather and a drip-
ping faucet. 1 Legal theory has been fascinated with the impli-
cations of those prior theories of change to law.' Similarly, the
Several authors have detailed the histories of the development of complexity theory,
which has been brought about largely through the efforts of the Santa Fe Institute. See
generally JAMEs GLEICK, CHAOS (1987) (discussing developments in chaos theory during
1970s); ROGER LEWIN, COMPLEXITY. LIFE AT THE EDGE OF CHAOS (1992) (recounting
developments in complexity theory during 1970s); M. MICHAEL WALDROP, COMPLEXITY:
THE EMERGING SCIENCE AT THE EDGE OF ORDER AND CHAOS (1992) (discussing devel-
opment of complexity theory at Santa Fe Institute). Current information about the field is
best obtained from the journal COMPLEXrY and from the internet world wide web pages of
the Santa Fe Institute, Studies in the Sciences of Complexity (visited January 21, 1997)
<http://sfi.santafe.edu/sfi/publications/addison-wesley.html>, and the Los Alamos
Nonlinear Science Information Center, Nonlinear Science e-Print Archive (visited January 21,
1997) <http://xyz.lanl.gov>.
" Complexity theory's underlying premise is that "similar patterns of activity can arise
in systems that differ greatly from one another in their composition and in the nature of
their parts.... They all show similar types of dynamic activity - rhythms, waves that prop-
agate in concentric circles or spirals that annihilate when they collide, and chaotic
behavior." GOODWIN, supra note 2, at 77.
" For example, a number of late-nineteenth- and twentieth-century American legal
theorists have expressly used Darwinian and other evolutionary models to explain the
development of legal rules. See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott, The Evolutionary Tradition in
Jurisprudence 85 COLuM. L. Rxv. 38 (1985) (tracing evolution as common underpinning for
different theories of law); Donald L. Horowitz, The Qu' an and the Common Law: Islamic Law
Reform and the Theory of Legal Change, 42 Am. J. COMP. L 233 (1994) (focusing on Islamic
law reform and comparing to other legal systems); Herbert Hovenkamp, Evolutionary Models
of Jurisprdence; 64 TEX. L. REV. 645 (1985) (examining theory of evolution and its role in
jurisprudence); M.B.W. Sinclair, The Use of Evolution Theory in Law, 64 U. DET. L. REV. 451
(1987) (examining theory of evolution and its applicability to law). For an overview of the
use of classical Newtonian scientific method in American legal theory, see Nancy Levit,
Listening to Tribal Legends: An Essay on Law and the Scientific Method, 58 FORDHAM L. REv. 263
(1989). For an application of what lies beyond classical scientific theory, providing an
exploration of how twentieth-century post-Newtonian physics might serve as a metaphorical
background for new legal theories, see Laurence H. Tribe, The Curvature of Constitutional
Space: What Lawyers Can Learn fiom Modem Physics, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1993). For a
discussion of how advanced principles of mathematics can apply to legal theory, see Mark
R. Brown & Andrew C. Greenburg, On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Law: Legal
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development of this new theory of change calls for our examina-
tion of what complexity theory has to say for law.
One of complexity theory's most striking developments has
been identifying properties of change that are common to many
forms of dynamical systems. These properties can be grouped
under several broad headings: (1) description of the behavior of
the system according to the community of its components; (2)
description of the mechanics of evolution in the system and the
coevolution of that process with change taking place in sur-
rounding, interconnected systems; and (3) description of the
direction of change in terms of overall system behavior and
success - the system's arrow. In this section we use these three
broad headings to summarize the major concepts in complexity
theory and demonstrate how they can be built into a model of
the process and direction of change in law.
1. Community - Prediction Is a Futile Exercise
Assuming we could gather all relevant information about a
dynamical system, that system could be described by the n vari-
ables that influence its behavior - such as mass, speed, size,
temperature,... n.25 Assuming we could find a big enough
computer, this community of variables could be plotted in an n-
dimensional space24 within which we could track the path, or
trajectory, of the system's evolution.' Generally, if a system has
more than a few variables, its trajectory is found to be nonlinear
in behavior. Nonlinear systems behave according to properties
that can be defined only through examination of the collection
Indeterminacy and the Implications of Metamathematics, 43 HASTINGs LJ. 1439 (1992), and John
M. Rogers & Robert E. Molzon, Some Lessons About the Law from Self-Referential Problems In
Mathematics, 90 MICH. L. REv. 992 (1992).
' The discussion in this section of the Article is derived principally from KAUFFMAN,
supra note 2, at 75, 187, which explains the structure of large Boolean numbers, and CAST,
supra note 2, at 33-37, 40-42, which explains the structure of dynamic systems. For a more
detailed exposition on how complexity theory offers a model for the dynamical behavior of
the sociolegal system, see Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm, supra note 3, at 916-26.
24 The system's phase space is "[a]n abstract space in which a single point completely
defines the instantaneous state of a dynamical system.... The dimension of the space
depends on the number of variables needed to define the system." PETER COVENEY & ROG-
ER HIGHFIELD, THE ARROW OF TIME 364 (1990).
25 Thus, "[a]s the system evolves in time it maps out a trajectory in the phase space."
[Vol. 30:405
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of the system components, not through reductionist study of any
one system component. For example, snow acts in ways not
readily apparent from the study of a single snowflake. This prop-
erty, known as emergence, is a special function of the power of
the type, number, and the level of interdependence of the
system's components. 6 When trajectories of such systems are
plotted, researchers find that most systems eventually settle into
one or more of three general behaviors based on what are re-
ferred to as the system's "attractors."27
One type of behavior would be represented by a trajectory
moving towards a fixed point in the plotting space. This is
known as a fixed point attractor system exhibiting stable steady
state behavior in which all of its variables stop changing (stasis)
once it is on the attractor. In a more complicated type of behav-
ior, the system, once on the attractor, exhibits a cyclical,
' A definition of emergence would be "a process that leads to the appearance of struc-
ture not directly described by the defining constraints and instantaneous forces that con-
trol a system." James P. Crutchfield, Is Anything Ever Newt: Considering Emergence, in COM-
PLExrIY: METAPHORS, MODELS, AND REALrrY, supra note 2, at 515, 516. Cohen explains that
the key to understanding why emergence occurs lies in the number of system components
and their interaction - with increasing numbers of system components, eventually the sum
effect of the interactions between the components becomes a dominating characteristic of
the system. See COHEN & STEWART, supra note 2, at 182 (explaining effect of increasing
components on system interaction). For example, a system consisting of 10 components
has 45 possible one-to-one pair combinations; a system of 1000 components has almost
5,000,000 such combinations; and a system of 1 million components has almost 5 billion
such pairings. See id. In large systems, therefore, "if the effect of any particular interaction
is tiny, we may not be able to work out what it is. We can't study it on its own, in a reduc-
tionist manner, because it's too small; but we can't study it as part of the overall system,
because we can't separate it from all the other interactions." Id.
" To suggest that there are only three kinds of attractors is a gross simplification, as
there are many subclasses and variations, but most texts lump the discussion into the three
broad categories we use in this Article. See CAsTi, supra note 2, at 28-42 (explaining fixed
point, limit cycle, and strange attractors); COVENEY & HIGHFIELD, supra note 24, at 157-58,
201-03.
An attractor is simply a model representation of the potential long term behavior of
the system, a useful concept for exploring different kinds of long-term behavior. See id. at
360. The attractor is not a force of attraction or a goal-oriented presence in the system, but
simply depicts where the system is headed based on the rules of motion in the system. See
COHEN & STEWART, supra note 2, at 206-07 (stating that chaotic activity defines where
attractor lies and where it will go). A lake draining a watershed illustrates this distinction.
The rainfall landing in the watershed moves according to forces of attraction such as gravi-
ty, the lake is the result of the collective interactions of rain with gravity, geography, and so
on, but is not itself a force of attraction for the rainfall. See KAUFFMAN, supra note 2, at 78
(explaining concept of attractors in large Boolean networks).
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trajectory repeatedly visiting some fixed set of points. This is
known as a limit cycle attractor system exhibiting stable periodic
behavior. In the third type of behavior, the system's trajectory
would be plotted as a tangled web buzzing around the surface
of its attractor in a never-repeating, never-crossing, aperiodic
trajectory. This is known as a strange attractor system exhibiting
chaotic behavior. Strange attractors are a core subject matter of
complexity theory.
Strange attractors are important because systems that are in
trajectories on them exhibit several forms of behavior in addi-
tion to emergence that lead to unpredictability of their trajecto-
ries. First, although strange attractor systems behave according to
deterministic rules, they display apparently random output - for
example, the same physical and chemical laws form all snow-
flakes, but no two are alike. This property is known as determin-
istic randomness or chaos behavior.' Second, a system exhibit-
ing such chaotic behavior is extremely sensitive to its initial and
temporal environmental conditions. This property, known as
sensitivity, means that two similar systems that at one time are
located at very close points can later be found to have diverged
from one another wildly?
Chaos behavior thus has been described as "order masquerading as randomness."
GLEICK, supra note 20, at 22. Classic examples of chaos in physical systems run by determin-
istic rules are the erratic dripping patterns from water faucets and the motion of a pinball.
See Tom Mullin, Turndent Times for Ruids, in EXPLORING CHAOS 59, 60-61 (Nina Hall ed.,
1991) (analyzing flow of water from tap and explaining mathematical complexity of model-
ing turbulent systems); Ian Percival, Chaos: A Science for the Real World, in EXPLORING CHAOS,
supa, at 11, 14-15 (analogizing motion of pinball to chaos in complex system). Although
the rules determining the presence of chaos in such systems may be simple and rigid, the
randomness of the system's behavior prevents easy discovery of all the rules merely by ob-
servation of the behavior. Thus, chaotic behavior "only looks complicated because you
don't know what the rule is." COHEN & STEWART, supra note 2, at 197. More to the point,
even if you did know what the rule is, making the system computable, you could not pre-
dict what will happen very far into the future.
2 A useful mental image that illustrates the difficulty of predicting the behavior of
systems experiencing sensitivity to initial and temporal conditions is the story of German
theoretical chemist Otto Rossler, who observed a saltwater taffy-pulling machine in opera-
tion. The story, as told by Casti, is that Rossler observed that the contraption stretched and
folded a batch of raisin taffy according to the same mechanical procedure over and over
again. However, the raisins in the taffy appeared to change relative positions with no appar-
ent order. He contemplated the question of what would be the long-term fate of two raisins
initially placed very close together, surmising that over time they might separate in position
quite dramatically. Indeed, although we know that the machine applies the same proce-
dure ad infinitum to the taffy, it would be very difficult to predict where the raisins will be
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Together, emergence, chaos, and sensitivity behaviors join to
give strange attractor systems a propensity to experience an
arbitrarily large divergence in trajectory based on arbitrarily
small changes in system variables. Sometimes, moreover, the
effect of a variable change, even one arbitrarily small in magni-
tude, is so pronounced that the system is thrown into the basin
of an altogether new attractor. The effect is like an avalanche
that occurs without warning after the temperature of a snow
mass rises just above a certain point. This is known as catastro-
phe behavior.' Given that a nonlinear system can display any
or all of these properties, predicting the complete system trajec-
tory for any substantial time period is so difficult that it is im-
possible in the true sense of the word.'
in relation to each other, say, one month into the process. See CAsTI, supra note 2, at 91-92
(illustrating repetitive stretching motion as chaotic process).
's See id. at 43-85 (explaining how small, gradual changes in causes can give rise to
catastrophic effects); COHEN & STEWART, supra note 2, at 209-12 (using climate change to
illustrate catastrophe theory). The unpredictability of catastrophe stems from the fact that
"it may take only the tiniest of changes to trigger the switch." Id. at 212. The result of such
an arbitrarily small perturbation of the system, however, can be an arbitrarily large, and
irreversible, shift in the system's rules of motion, known technically as the vector field. This
can produce a radical change in the system's behavior. See CASTI, supra note 2, at 26, 89-90
(defining vector field and illustrating effect small changes may have on system's rule of
motion).
" Beginning with Kurt G6del's work in the 1930s and culminating more recently with
Gregory Chaitin's research, mathematicians have demonstrated that no form of proof
chain can prove all the truth that is meaningful to a formal axiomatic system. Provable
truths, it turns out, are infinitely less in number than truths which cannot be proved using
the axiomatic system. The latter are nonetheless true since they exist as possible outcomes
of the universe the formal axiomatic system is attempting to describe. Some truths, howev-
er, are provable but so complex in behavior that they are not capable of prediction. Calcu-
lating them is on the same order of difficulty as simply waiting for them to be observed,
and hence they appear random. Strange attractors are personified by this type of truth -
deterministic (provable) randomness (unpredictable). See JOHN L. CASTI, SEARCHING FOR
CERTTANTY 75-76 (1990) (asserting that chaotic processes defy accurate computational pre-
diction);John L. Casti, Confronting Science's Logical Limits, SC. AM., Oct. 1996, at 102, 103-05
(discussing similarity in unanswerability between mathematics and nature); Gregory
Chaitin, A Random Walk in Arithmetic, in EXPLORING CHAOS, supra note 28, at 196, 201-02
[hereinafter Chaitin, A Random Walk] (arguing randomness and unpredictability as unify-
ing principles); GregoryJ. Chaitin, Randomness in Arithmetic and the Decline and Fall of Reduc-
tionism in Pure Mathematics, in COOPERATION AND CONFLICT IN GENERAL EVOLUTIONARY
PROCESSES 89, 93-112 (John L. Casti & Anders Karlqvist eds., 1995) (describing potential
for new approach to mathematics due to computer technology). Chaitin's work in this field
is also available on the Internet. See G.J. Chaitin Home Page (visited Mar. 3, 1996)
<http://www.research.ibm.com/people/c/chaitin> (connecting user to Chaitin's home
page). In summary, this highly technical branch of mathematics proves that "[flor every
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Despite their unpredictability, we should not think of strange
attractors as being all for the worse. To the contrary, because
they are not limited by rigid properties, as are fixed point and
limit cycle attractors, strange attractors can adapt to perturba-
tions in the system's environment."2 Consider when a bacterium
capable of evolving through wildly variable mutations (strange
attractor sensitivity) meets an antibiotic that applies an unchang-
ing strategy of attack (fixed point attractor stability). Eventually,
the bacterium may evolve into a form that avoids the antibiotic's
method of attack, and the antibiotic will be powerless to counter
adapt. In a harsh world, adaptation means survival.
To be sure, a system consisting of nothing but strange
attractors may spin wildly out of control at the drop of a pin
without adapting in any beneficial way. The consistency and
order that comes with the fixed point and limit cycle attractors
provide their own benefits. This is why researchers have found
that the most robust systems manage to stay balanced between
order and chaos through a delicate mix of fixed and periodic
(ordered) and strange (chaotic) attractors. In a sense, because
consistent formalization of arithmetic, there exist arithmetic truths unprovable within that
formal system," and hence "[t] here exist numbers having complexity greater than any theo-
ry of mathematics can prove." CASTI, supra note 2, at 139, 146. Translated into broader
complexity theory principles, this means that "we'll never get at all the truths by following
rules; there's always something out there in the real world that resists being fenced in by a
deductive argument." Id. at 150. To the extent, therefore, that society conceives of law as
its formal axiomatic system for describing sociolegal behavior and conditions, there is no
predictivist legal theory that can be accurate all of the time. Society will experience
sociolegal outcomes that could never have been predicted using the available laws, regard-
less of how many laws we add to the pot to attempt to improve prediction. See Ruhl, Com-
plexity Theoy as a Paradigm, supra note 3, at 893-906 (critiquing modem American legal
system from complexity theory perspective); Rogers & Molzon, supra note 22, at 997-1002
(analogizing legal systems to axiomatic systems). We demonstrate later why this gap be-
tween prediction and reality leads to stress in the sociolegal system that increases with the
addition of new laws to the system. See infra text accompanying notes 149-50 (theorizing
that increased investment in legal structure leads to decreasing returns).
Adaptation is associated with the feedback and feed forward loops made possible by
multiple paths of interactions between system components. See infra notes 50-54 and accom-
panying text (describing coevolution of systems resulting from feedback responses). Thus,
adaptation "is an emergent property which spontaneously arises through the interaction of
simple components." GLEicIc, supra note 20, at 339 n.314. Adaptation allows "the system to
restructure, or at least modify, the interaction pattern." CASTI, supra note 2, at 271.
" Thus, "complex systems constructed such that they are poised on the boundary
between order and chaos are the ones best able to adapt by mutation and selection. Such
poised systems appear to be best able to coordinate complex, flexible behavior and best
422
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the presence of ordered behavior is holding them back from the
edge, these systems can draw as much as possible from the adap-
tive qualities of emergence, chaos, sensitivity, and catastrophe
properties without falling all the way into disaster. A system
poised in this manner "at the edge of chaos" is likely to be
adaptive and successful - a complex adaptive system.'
These concepts provide an apt analogy for law.' The evolu-
tion of law can be described by identifying the attractors that
define the underlying basic norms that legitimize the sociolegal
outcome for a particular set of issues. Law has no fixed set of
attractors. Instead, it has a variable spectrum of first-order princi-
ples that we point to as the foundations and justifications for
legal rules designed to resolve social issues. At any given time,
therefore, a rule of law exhibiting the behavior of some underly-
ing attractor or basic norm of legal order may govern a particu-
lar social issue. For example, the doctrine of regulatory takings
of property, which the Supreme Court has attempted on many
occasions to divine from the Fifth Amendment,' can be por-
trayed as a tussle between three attractors of the sociolegal sys-
tem - freedoms, rights, and regulations. That is, one's freedom
to use property as one wishes can be restricted by rights vested
able to respond to changes in their environment." Stuart A. Kauffman, Wspersfiom Caraot:
The Origins of Order and Pinciples of Adaptation in Complex Nonequilibrium Systems, in COMPLEX-
rry: METAPHORS, MODELS, AND REALrTY, supra note 2, at 83. Complexity theory refers to
these systems as Complex Adaptive Systems or CAS. See HOLLAND, supra note 1, at 4 (com-
paring disparate subjects exhibiting unique complicating dynamics but which nevertheless
demonstrate trait of coherence under change, and are thus collectively referred to as CAS).
' Theorists call the complex behavior region the "sweet spot" or the "edge of chaos."
See Kauffman, supra note 33, at 84.
' For a detailed description of the strength of the analogy, see Ruhl, Compexity Theoy
as a Paradigm, supra note 3, at 866-75, 880-92, which traces seemingly unpredictable tidal
shifts of sociolegal structure to the underlying logic or attractor that threads through and
binds to the process of legal evolution.
' "[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation."
U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Court's earlier jurisprudence had established the "regulatory
takings" doctrine, that is, "if [governmental] regulation goes too far it will be recognized as
1997] 423
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in others, through such means as the law of nuisance, and gov-
ernment regulation, such as land use controls.37
As legal systems traverse near their attractors, moreover, we
find repeated examples of behavior resembling the surprises that
emanate from emergence, chaos, sensitivity, and catastrophe.
Often a law designed to address a problem identified in society
has effects never anticipated at the time of enactment. An exam-
ple is the federal Superfund law, which was designed to
remediate contaminated lands through, among other mecha-
nisms, stringent liability rules. Those rules led completely unex-
pectedly to the widespread "brownfields" problem, in which
abandoned urban industrial sites in communities sorely in need
of economic investment lie idle because of potential developers'
a taking." Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). Although its jurispru-
dence developed little in the way of guidelines for applying that principle, the Court's
decisions evolved towards the general doctrine that land use regulation constitutes a taking
when it "does not substantially advance legitimate state interests or denies an owner eco-
nomically viable use of his land." Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (cita-
tions omitted). For an extremely comprehensive history of the regulatory takings doctrine
and the legal commentary thereon, see William Michael Treanor, The Original Understand-
ing of the Takings Clause and the Political Proces=, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 782 (1995).
" Only when government regulation restricts freedom of property use in ways that
exceed that which could be enforced by rights of nuisance action does the government
have to determine whether the property has been taken within the meaning of the Consti-
tution. The Supreme Court explained that
confiscatory regulations, ie., regulations that prohibit all economically benefi-
cial use of land ... cannot be newly legislated or decreed (without compensa-
tion), but must inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that background
principles of the State's law of property and nuisance already place upon land
ownership. A law or decree with such an effect must, in other words, do no
more than duplicate the result that could have been achieved in the courts -
by adjacent landowners (or other uniquely affected persons) under the State's
law of private nuisance, or by the State under its complementary power to
abate nuisances that affect the public generally, or otherwise.
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1029 (1992).
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fear of liability under Superfund.' Other examples abound in
the different walks of law. 9
Professor William Rodgers has written extensively about what he calls statutory
"sleepers (provisions with consequences not anticipated at the time of enactment)," which,
he asserts, "have played an important role in the history of environmental law." WILLIAM H.
RODGERS, JR., ENWRONMENTAL LAW § 1.3, at 43 (2d ed. 1994). The brownfields phenome-
non is a classic example. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1994), generally imposes strict liability on
the present owner of a contaminated property regardless of the owner's lack of involve-
ment in causing the risk to human health or the environment. See ALFRED R. LIGHT,
CERCLA LAW AND PROcEDuRE § 4.5.1 (1991) (noting obfuscation and confusion in legisla-
tive history concerning any causation or nexus standard for liability under statute); see gener-
ally Mehron Azarmehr, Status of Joint and Several Liability Under CERCLA After Bell Petro-
leum, 24 ENVrL L REP. 10250 (1994) (examining legislative and case law history prior to
and after In re Bell Petroleum, which found that joint and several liability was not mandatory
in CERCLA cases). The Environmental Protection Agency's regulations implementing
CERCLA, see 40 C.F.R. pt. 300 (1995), involve a complicated and lengthy process of site
investigation, remedy selection, and negotiation between the government and responsible
parties. See LIGHT, supra, at §§ 3.2.5-3.3.6 (detailing CERCLA's remedial investigation, feasi-
bility study, selection of remedy, remedial design, and enforcement procedures). The aver-
age cost of completing an investigation and remedy selection at a CERCLA site is $1.3
million, and the average cost of implementing the remedy is around $30 million. SeeJerry
L. Anderson, The Hazardous Waste Land, 13 VA. ENvrL LJ. 1, 10-11 (1993) (exploring ways
to recoup expenses from potentially responsible parties). These factors create the condi-
tions under which "financiers are frequently not supportive of industrial redevelopment
projects. The fear of becoming involved with these properties has left historical industrial
and commercial centers - often associated with industrial and port areas - with a de-
creasing number of sites in which new businesses can flourish, and an eroding tax base."
Bernard A. Weintraub & Sy Garza, The Redevelopment of Brownsites, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T,
Spring 1995, at 57; see, e.g., E. Lynn Grayson & Stephen A. K. Palmer, The Brownfields Phe-
nomenon: An Analysis of Environmental, Economic, and Community Concerns, 25 ENVTL. L REP.
10,337, 10,337-38 (1995) (explaining issues surrounding redevelopment of abandoned
urban hazardous waste sites); Julia A. Solo, Urban Decay and the Role of Superfunik Legal Barn-
ers to Redevelopment and Prospects for Change, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 285, 285 (1995) (arguing that
Superfund has detrimental effect on renewal and should be amended); R. Michael Sweeny,
Bronfields Restoration and Voluntary Cleanup Legislation, 2 ENVrL L 101, 101 (1995) (discuss-
ing voluntary cleanup initiatives and suggestions for reuse and redevelopment of industrial
sites). Another example, though more comical in nature, involved the vegetable oil indus-
try. It realized that the broad definition of "oil" found in the Oil Pollution Act of 1990
would subject tanker vessel transportation of vegetable oils to the same level of regulation
as is applied to petroleum oils. The oil industry successfully lobbied regulatory agencies to
enact the Edible Oil Regulatory Reform Act, requiring the agencies charged with imple-
menting the Oil Pollution Act to differentiate between the types of oils. Nonetheless, the
industry remains disappointed with the severity of the regulations the agencies ultimately
promulgated. See Jeanne Grasso, OPA 90 - How Good Intentions Can Lead to Unintended
Result, ENvL. AT MD., Fall 1996, at 15, 17 (criticizing regulation as imposing significant
costs without providing additional cleanup or damages fund).
" See, e.g., Air Bags Cut Fatalities, But Increase the Risk for Elderly, Children, WALL ST. J.,
Oct. 4, 1996, at A2 (reporting that federal study shows air bags, mandatory in certain vehi-
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Probably no one is surprised that law often exhibits these
unexpected outcomes, not any more than we are surprised by
changes in the weather. However, complexity theory helps us
understand the underlying sources of those seemingly random
occurrences and formulate strategies for managing their causes
and effects. In particular, complexity theory demonstrates that
reductionist approaches to analyzing the causes and effects of
dynamical system behavior, which approaches have been the
signature of classical science and legal theory, will unwittingly
lead society to decisions that only exacerbate the surprise phe-
nomenon.4
Complexity theory thus can prompt new ways of looking at
sociolegal behavior. If law and society interact as a dynamical
system, how can we approach law in ways that promote a
cles after specified dates, pose increased risks to certain subpopulations); Marci A. Hamil-
ton, Next, Congress Will Protect Your Right to Sunny Weather, WALL ST.J., Sept. 18, 1996, at Al9
(describing unintended applications of Religious Freedom Restoration Act); Doug Levy,
Doctors Study Fitness of Spouse-Abuse Laws, USA TODAY, Sept. 9, 1996, at D1 (noting that physi-
cians are concerned that laws requiring them to report cases of spouse abuse will deter
victims from seeking care).
Not wishing to take full blame for these results, some Congress members contend that
judicial and administrative interpretations of the laws often defeat or at least depart from
the legislative intent. These members suggest that Congress periodically convene a "correc-
tions day" to clean up such problems by corrective legislative action. See John Copeland
Nagle, Corrections Day, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1267, 1268 (1996). Nagle posits that these "mis-
takes" are generally perceived as errors by Congress, courts interpreting the statute, or
agencies implementing the statute. In fact, Nagle argues, all such mistakes are attributable
to Congress being sloppy, unthinking, neglectful, or wrong. See id. at 1273-80. He admits of
one exception in this regard: when "the consequences of a statute were unforeseeable -
not just unforeseen - when Congress enacted the statute, then Congress cannot be
blamed for a problem it could not have anticipated." Id. at 1280 n.44. This exception is, in
our view, an enormous one, perhaps suggesting that it is not fruitful to think of any unin-
tended consequences as being the result of anybody's "mistake." Indeed, although we do
not condone sloppy, unthinking, or neglectful legislative behavior, we suggest that the
harder Congress tries to predict the outcome of its enactments and anticipate misfirings,
the more "mistakes" it will commit.
See Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradign, supra note 3, at 893-916. By "reductionist"
we mean the belief that an observable, complex phenomenon can be studied and fully
understood by first reducing it to its simplest, indivisible components in operation during
the phenomenon. The process then requires studying each of those components until a
complete understanding of its nature is obtained. Finally, one must reassemble all the
components, understanding each as part of the whole, the premise being that the rules of
operation of the whole are now fully understood. That form of analysis has predominated
as an organizing principle for classical scientific inquiry for centuries. See COHEN & STEW-
ART, supra note 2, at 33-34 (reviewing philosophy of reductionism).
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complex adaptive system capable of withstanding stress from
within and without? We must, at the very least, be attuned to
the balance between ordered and chaotic forces that is essential
to maintain adaptive qualities. But these forces also lead inevita-
bly to unpredictable qualities in law.4' When legal institutions
are premised on the objective of producing centralized, predict-
able, lasting, stable output, therefore, should we not consider
whether the cost of that reductionist approach is adaptability of
the sociolegal system?
4 2
2. Evolution and Coevolution - There Is No Absolute End
Point Structure
The n-variable model of the community of components in a
system also serves as the foundation of complexity theory's mod-
el of evolutionary mechanics.4' Consider what happens when
any one variable in a system is altered, say for the purpose of
improving fitness. For example, the weight of a predator species
might be increased. That change might increase the animal's
strength, but also slow it down. At some point the increase in
weight might slow the animal down so much that the increase
in strength is irrelevant, perhaps because its former prey is too
fast for it. When variables both within and between systems"
are coupled or interrelated in this manner, the system may
experience conflicting constraints between variables. Adding too
For example, even bastions of classical economics are resigned to the fact that
"[t]wo hundred years of economic 'science' have done nothing to improve the ability of
forecasters to predict recessions." See Alan Murray, The Outlook A Recession Awaits the Next
President, WALL ST. J., Aug. 26, 1996, at Al.
Q For a discussion of how other commentators have addressed that question, without
the benefit of complexity theory but leading to the same conclusions we believe are
reached under a complexity theory based analysis, see Ruhl, Complexity Theory as a Paradigm,
supra note 3, at 906-26.
" The discussion in this section of the Article is derived principally from KAuFFMAN,
supra note 2, at 31. For a more detailed exposition on how complexity theory offers a mod-
el for the evolution of the sociolegal system, see Ruhl, The Fitness of Law, supra note 3, at
1407.
" Until now the discussion has focused on the behavioral mechanics of a single sys-
tem. As this section of the Article demonstrates, however, evolution of any single system
involves the interaction of that system within nested multi-levels of related systems.
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much of one variable to improve one aspect of system behavior
could trigger responses in another variable that work against the
system.'
If the level of system success expected at each of the combi-
nations of system variables could be plotted, the result would be
a "map" of the relative fitness of the combinations - a fitness
landscape displaying "peaks" of high fitness combinations and
"valleys" of low fitness combinations.' The objective of adaptive
change in the system, of course, is to stay on the high parts of
this landscape in the face of outside disturbances. The mechan-
ics of moving over the landscape, therefore, are of great interest
to the system. The system might "walk" across the landscape
through gradual, incremental testing of altered variable combi-
nations, hoping to find a higher spot.47 But that mode of travel
is slow and prevents the system from quickly testing faraway
s As Kauffman explains:
Here is the problem: in a fixed environment, the contribution of one trait -
say, short versus long nose - to the organism's fitness might depend on other
traits - for example, bowed versus straight legs. Perhaps having a short nose is
very useful if one is also bowlegged, but a short nose is harmful if one is
straight legged.... In short, the contribution to overall fitness of the organism
of one state of one trait may depend in very complex ways on the states of
many other traits.
KAuFFmAN, supra note 2, at 170.
Kauffman describes "variations toward 'peaks' of high fitness on a fitness landscape.
And natural selection is thought of as 'pulling' an adapting population towards such peaks.
We can imagine a mountain range on which populations of organisms... are feeling their
way to the summit." Id. at 154; see also COVENEY & HIGHFIELD, supra note 2, at 108 (suggest-
ing fitness landscape is "[a] mountainous terrain showing the locations of the global maxi-
mum (highest peak) and global minimum (lowest valley) [and] [tihe height of a feature is
a measure of its fitness"). The image of a fitness landscape has been used since the biolo-
gist Sewall Wright first proposed it in the 1930s as a way of discussing gene combinations.
Since then, with the advantage of high-speed computers, complexity theory researchers
have made tremendous strides in exploring the quantities and processes upon which the
landscape is imposed in a variety of applications. See, e.g., Catherine A. Macken & Peter F.
Stadler, Evolution on fitness Landscapes, in 1993 LECTURES [N COMPLEX SYSTEMS 43, 45-46
(Lynn Nadel & Daniel L. Stein eds., 1995) (reviewing Wright's landscape model as adapted
by Maynard Smith to protein evolution, by Spiegelman to in vitro evolution, and by
Kauffman to affinity maturation in immune response).
The rules of the "adaptive walk" are simple: starting from wherever the species is on
its fitness landscape, consider the fitness level that results when a randomly chosen gene is
altered. If it is a fitter level, go there; if it is not a fitter level, try again. See KAUFFMAN, supra
note 2, at 166 (demonstrating random fitness landscape populated by randomly assigned
fitness levels to 16 genes, wherein natural selection and self-organization are observed).
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points to find peaks significantly higher than those nearby.
Therefore, the system might find a way to "jump" greater dis-
tances across the landscape, as risky as that might be. Indeed, by
tapping into the emergent, chaotic, sensitive, and catastrophic
system forces, which can trigger large shifts in system trajectory
based on small changes in system variables, a very long jump
may be possible, though its destination will be unpredictable.'
The metaphor of fitness landscapes carries complexity theory
far in describing evolution in a host of different systems, particu-
larly in biology. For example, sex - the exchange of genes
between two species members on their relative fitness peaks
through sexual reproduction - offers a way of moving much
further across fitness landscapes than is available to species who
reproduce without gene exchange.49 To be sure, not all sexual
reproduction significantly improves the species. But sex enhanc-
es the possibility of significant advances because the power to
move far across the fitness landscape is presented. Complexity
theory offers an explanation of why sex developed as an evolu-
tionary strategy and how it works.
The fitness landscape metaphor, moreover, also reveals the
mechanics of coevolution of systems.s' As one species moves
' Such events in nature are often known as accidents. The power of accident - of the
chaos, emergence, sensitivity, and catastrophe that small accidents can unleash - should
not be underestimated. Starting at the small level and working up, it seems clear that
the space of possible molecules is vaster than the number of atoms in the uni-
verse. Once this is true, it is evident that the actual molecules in the biosphere
are a tiny fraction of the space of the possible. Almost certainly, then, the mol-
ecules we see are to some extent the results of historical accidents in the histo-
ry of life.
I& at 186.
1 Many evolutionary biologists believe that "sex has evolved.., to permit genetic
recombination. And recombination provides a kind of approximation to a God's-eye view
of ... large-scale features of fitness landscapes." Id. at 180. Indeed, sex is counterintuitive,
in that it requires two parents and involves each parent's sacrifice of gene structures that
allowed it to live long enough to reproduce; whereas a haploid organism can simply pass its
genes intact along to its offspring, and they to theirs, with only the possibility of mutation
to upset (or improve) the design. See id. (detailing numerous advantages resulting from
genetic recombination compared to reproduction as result of division); see also GELL-MANN,
supra note 2, at 253 (asking rhetorically, "What are males really good for?"). There must be
some benefit, therefore, to genetic recombination that outweighs the benefit of genetic
stasis. That benefit, according to complexity theory, is the ability it offers species to jump
across landscapes.
o As Kauffman explains,
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across its landscape, the conflicting constraints presented to
other systems at the same or different levels of the hierarchy of
systems may change, altering their respective fitness landscapes.
A swifter prey, for example, changes the fitness landscape of its
predator. Perhaps the predator will also evolve into a swifter
form, possibly at the expense of strength, and wind up finding
another prey species; or perhaps the predator species will fail to
evolve and lose all its fitness (become extinct). In any event,
when any two systems are coupled in this manner, evolution in
one system alters the fitness landscape of the other. Any evolu-
tionary response in the latter is then felt in the fitness landscape
of the former, and so on. Coevolution between interrelated
systems is like an endless exercise in game theory."
Research has indicated that the coevolutionary process be-
tween systems, like the behavior of the community of variables
in any single system, may exhibit orderly or chaotic behavior
depending on how tightly coupled are the systems involved in
the coevolutionary interplay. There is a level of variables that
defines how each system influences and is influenced by others
in its environment. The more tightly connected those influences
are, the more chaotic the systems' coevolution will be. A balance
point in that spectrum - the point of transition from order to
chaos - thus exists at which system dynamics are optimized."
Moreover, the more broadly the coevolutionary connections are
spread into separate "patches" of evolutionary dynamics, the
[t]he idealization we have used [thus far] that fitness landscapes are fixed and
unchanging is false. Fitness landscapes change because the environment chang-
es. And the fitness landscape of one species changes because the other species
that form its niche themselves adapt on their own fitness landscapes. Bat and
frog, preditor [sic] and prey, coevolve. Each adaptive move by the bats deforms
the landscape of the frogs.
KAUFFMAN, supra note 2, at 208.
" See id. at 217-21 (analogizing between coevolution and famous "Prisoners' Dilem-
ma"). Kauffman notes that in a single game of the Prisoners' Dilemma, the rational strate-
gy of the two independent agents is defect-defect, but that in a repeated game different
strategies emerge as the independent agents come to understand the coordinated nature
of their choices. This effect, posits Kauffman, provides an analogy to the coevolution of
fitness landscapes, though coevolution in biological organisms takes place without con-
scious predecision. See id.
52 See i&. at 230 (explaining that "[tihe highest average fitness occurs precisely at the
transition from order to chaos").
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more adaptive the coevolutionary process will be at any level of
coupling."3 A "patchy" system has more problem-solving units in
operation and is more able to absorb a "hit" from outside. A
corn field, for example, is less adaptive to external stress than is
a diverse forest ecosystem.
Having laid down these basic models, complexity theory focus-
es on testing what happens in systems that are tightly coupled
versus those which are loosely coupled, how many patches are
needed to foster adaptive problem solving, the impact of the
size of the system, how much change in one system is needed to
prompt change in another, and so on.' These are questions
that can be posed with respect to law as well.
The fitness landscape analogy may provide new insights into
the evolution of law. Laws certainly face conflicting con-
straints.' For example, a prominent theme in environmental
law is whether land use regulation has bumped up against the
protection of private property under the regulatory takings doc-
trine.s' The fitness of a land use regulation law - its success in
Kauffman explains:
The basic idea of patch procedure is simple: take a hard, conflict-laden task in
which many parts interact, and divide it into a quilt of nonoverlapping patches.
Try to optimize within each patch. As this occurs, the couplings between parts
in two patches across patch boundaries will mean that finding a "good" solu-
tion in one patch will change the problem to be solved by the parts in adjacent
patches. Since changes in each patch will alter the problems confronted by the
neighboring patches, and the adaptive moves by those patches in turn will alter
the problem faced by yet other patches, the system is just like our model
coevolving ecosystems.
Id. at 252-53.
' See, e.g., id, at 171-206 (discussing limits to selection, self-organization, rugged land-
scapes, and coevolution). Kauffman's work suggests that the coupling effect and the ques-
tions flowing from it have universal application to any complex adaptive system. Commen-
tators in the field of organizational behavior have also focused on these questions, particu-
larly the level of coupling. See, e.g., Frank W. Lutz, Tightening Up Loose Coupling in Organiza-
tions of Higher Education, 27 ADMIN. SI. Q. 653 (1982) (concluding that universities' success
hinges on becoming more tightly coupled). Other legal commentators have pointed to
their work as having significance to legal systems. See, e.g., M.B.W. Sinclair, Plugs, Holes,
Filters, and Goals: An Analysis of Legislative Attitudes, 41 N.Y.L. Scs. L. REv. 237, 264-68 (using
coupling theory to analyze legislative attitudes toward statutory control).
' One of the major conclusions Peter Yeager reached after his years-long study of the
Environmental Protection Agency was that there are "systemically embedded constraints in
our political economy" and that "the operation of [such] constraints.., is a dynamic pro-
cess." See PETER C. YEAGER, THE LIMITS OF LAW 30 (1991).
For example, we believe most observers would agree that the enforcement of the
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meeting its goals - thus may depend on whether it can avoid
that conflicting constraint. And whether the regulation avoids
that constraint in the long run may depend on how the regula-
tory takings doctrine itself changes, as it has appeared to do
recently. 7
Law's evolution may make long jumps across the fitness land-
scape to survive in this coevolving world. For example, nuisance
law was once the core of environmental law.s Over time, the
Endangered Species Act has bumped up against a significant conflicting constraint in the
form of increased concerns about the effect of species protection regulation on the use
and value of private property. See J.B. Ruhl, Biodiversity Conservation and the Ever-Expanding
Web of Federal Laws Regulating Nonfederal Lands: Time for Something Completely Different?, 66 U.
COLO. L REv. 555, 582-601, 632-42 (1995) (discussing property rights motivated backlash
against Endangered Species Act);J.B. Ruhl, Section 7(a)(1) of the WNew"Endangered Species Act:
Rediscovering and Redefining Federal Agencies' Duty to Conserve Species, 25 ENVrL. L 1107, 1137-
43 (1995) (discussing shift in attitude from species protection to protection of property
rights). This type of regulation relying on increased and more coercive command-and-con-
trol forms of species protection on private lands poses no realistic chance of being held a
regulatory taking. See Glenn P. Sugameli, Takings Issues in Light of Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council: A Decision Full of Sound and Fury Signifying Nothing, 12 VA. ENvriL. J. 439,
504 (1993) (concluding that post-Lucas judicial developments show that Lucas has limited
practical effect on real property regulation). Today's political reality, however, makes such
a law highly unlikely to be a "fitter" legal structure in the long run than the present struc-
ture or a structure relying on alternative methods of regulation. Indeed, many legislative
initiatives at the federal and state level are overt efforts to retract environmental regulation,
especially species protection laws, where it is perceived as having "gone too far" with re-
spect to private property rights. See generaly David Coursen, Property Rights Legislation: A
Survey of Federal and State Assessment and Compensation Measures, 26 ENvrL L. REP. 10,239
(1996) (surveying current federal proposals and state laws designed to safeguard private
property rights). That movement in turn has spurred legal commentators to examine the
early foundations of property law to determine whether private property rights have always
carried with them the extensive freedoms they are often portrayed as having always had.
See, e.g., Fred P. Bosselman, Limitations Inherent in the Title to Wetlands at Common Law, 15
STAN. ENvrL. LJ. 248 (1996) (arguing that courts should apply English Common Law to
wetlands regulation cases); Myrl L Duncan, Property as a Public Conversation, Not a Lockean
Soliloquy: A Role of Intellectual Legal History in Takings Analysis, 26 ENVri L 1095 (1996)
(discussing how dynamic tension between private and public rights in American property
law shapes environmental policy); James M. McElfish, Jr. et al., Property: Past, Present, Future,
ENVrL. F., Sept.-Oct. 1996, at 20 (arguing that environmental regulation is necessary to
preserve individual property rights).
" See supra notes 36-37 and accompanying text (explaining regulatory takings doctrine
and its development).
' A nontrespassory nuisance is the invasion of another's interest in the private use and
enjoyment of land. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D (1979). It is no exaggera-
tion to say that
[t]here is no common law doctrine that approaches nuisance in comprehen-
siveness or detail as a regulator of land use and technological abuse. Nuisance
432
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rapid increase in pollution outstripped the effectiveness of nui-
sance law. Therefore, in the 1970s, the system made a long
jump to what was then a much fitter form of regulation -
command-and-control statutes.59 The rest of society has not
stood motionless since the 1970s, however. Rather, it has evolved
in response to that statutory response and today poses very real
challenges to the fitness of the command-and-control ap-
proach.'
Society is thus on the brink of addressing system-level ques-
tions regarding environmental law that are similar to those ad-
dressed by any other set of coevolving systems. These questions
include the appropriate balance of federal and state powers (a
question of patch size) and the degree to which regulatory,
market, or privatized forces will become the primary policy mak-
ing tool (a question of coupling).61 Therefore, change in law
actions reach pollution of all physical media - air, water, land, groundwater -
by a wide variety of means. Nuisance actions have challenged virtually every
major industrial and municipal activity that today is the subject of comprehen-
sive environmental regulation.... Nuisance theory and case law is the com-
mon law backbone of modern environmental and energy law.
RODGERS, supra note 38, § 2.1, at 112. Through the nuisance doctrine, courts have shut
down several polluting operations. See, e.g., City of Harrisonville v. W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg.
Co., 289 U.S. 334, 339-40 (1933) (awarding damages caused by municipal pollution of
stream); Steiffer v. City of Kansas City, 267 P.2d 474, 479 (Kan. 1954) (enjoining operation
of municipal landfill because of fires and odors); Whalen v. Union Bag & Paper Co., 101
N.E. 805, 806 (N.Y. 1913) (enjoining operation of industry found to cause pollution of
agricultural land); Costas v. City of Fond Du Lac, 129 N.W.2d 217, 222 (Wis. 1964) (enjoin-
ing operation of municipal sewage disposal plant because of its emission of noxious odors).
" From 1970 through 1976, in quick order Congress enacted or substantially amended
10 major environmental regulation statutes covering air, water, and land pollution, project
planning, workplace safety, manufacturing, species protection, and public drinking water.
SeeJ. William Futrell, The Histoy of Environmental Law, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: FROM RE-
SOURCES TO RECOVERY, § 1.2(I) (1), at 35 (1993) (compiling congressional statutes regulat-
ing environment). That record was nearly duplicated during the same period in the field
of natural resources protection. See id. § 1.2(I)(4), at 39 (collecting statutes protecting
natural resources).
' For example, the recent literature is replete with commentary addressing the inade-
quate degree of sensitivity of the present environmental law regulatory system to matters of
economic efficiency, risk allocation, and private property rights. For a current and compre-
hensive overview of the thrust of reform proposals on these fronts, see Robert L. Glicksman
& Stephen B. Chapman, Regulatory Reform and (Breach oJ) the Contract with America, 5 KAN.
J.L & PUB. POL'Y, Winter 1996, at 9 (1996).
" For a discussion of how other commentators have addressed those questions, with-
out the benefit of complexity theory but leading to conclusions which we believe a com-
plexity theory based analysis supports, see Ruhl, 77e Fitness of Law, supra note 3, at 1408-37.
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appears to follow processes which can be described using the
tools of analysis that the complexity theory model has assem-
bled. As complexity theory develops deeper understandings of
the mechanics of fitness landscapes and system coevolution,
perhaps the dynamics of legal evolution will be better under-
stood as well.6"
3. The Arrow - Decisions Are Not Revocable
The image of coevolving fitness landscapes illustrates the
point made in the beginning of this section - the path of the
law is a one-way street. When a system steps across its metaphor-
ical fitness landscape, the coevolutionary impact with other cou-
pled systems' landscapes transforms the former's reality. The
peak left behind may be there no more. This means that a
system can not turn back along its trajectory to a point in the
past. It may only make forward turns and curves.
At any point in time, the best guide for which direction to
choose is the fitness landscape. One challenge, however, is that
every step up a hill or peak on the landscape (a decision) pres-
ents several dilemmas, even if it is the best decision of the mo-
ment. First, at least at that point in time, the peak has a finite
height, and the system risks getting stuck there.63 Of course,
62 Another important and strongly parallel field of study in this regard is known as law
and biology, whose adherents examine the relationship between the biological evolution of
human behavior and legal rules and institutions. See, e.g., MARGARET GRUTER, LAW AND THE
MIND (1991) (examining link between human development and creation of law); THE
SENSE OFJUSTICE (Roger D. Masters & Margaret Gruter eds., 1991) (analyzing link between
human development and sense of justice); Owen D. Jones, Evolutionary Analysis in Law. An
Introduction and Application to Child Abus4 75 N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming Apr. 1997) (describ-
ing model for analyzing evolutionary behavioral traits for use in developing legal policy
regarding child abuse); Owen D. Jones, Law of Evolutionary Biology: Obstacles and Opportuni-
ties, 10J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 265 (1994) (examining relationship between evolu-
tionary biology and law); William H. Rodgers, Jr., Deception, SelfDeception, and Mythology: The
Law of the Salmon in the Pacic Northwest, 26 PAC. LJ. 821 (1995) (analyzing relationship
between evolutionary theory of deception and self-deception as applied to laws regulating
salmon fishing).
Kauffman explains that adaptive walks
proceed uphill until a local peak is reached. Like a hilltop in a mountainous
area, such a local peak is higher than any point in its immediate vicinity, but
may be far lower than the highest peak, the global optimum. Adaptive walks
stop on such local peaks.... [T]hey are trapped, with no way to get to the
distant high summits.
[Vol. 30:405
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peaks are precarious places. They rise, fall, and change in rug-
gedness with the undulating fitness landscape. The decision
must be made whether to stay, if a rising trend is anticipated, or
move on, if the opposite is expected. But the chances of finding
higher peaks, even via a long jump, diminish as the system's
fitness level goes up."' More system energy is expended to
make the same incremental step up the fitness landscape as the
last one, because with every step up, the number of higher
peaks necessarily falls and thus the distance to higher peaks
more likely becomes further. In other words, following the up
arrow has its ever-increasing price: because of the irreversibility
of the system, decisions leading to reduced fitness cannot be
"taken back," returning the system to its pre-decision conditions.
Because of the increased expenditure required for every incre-
mental step of increased fitness, the system experiences dimin-
ishing returns on its investments of energy.
The properties of diminishing returns and irreversibility are
found in many applications.' Complexity theory and its fitness
KAUFFMAN, supra note 2, at 167. The more rugged the local landscape, the more likely the
species will be trapped on a lower peak. See id,
" This is an inherent feature of an adaptive walk across a correlated fitness landscape,
in that "with every step one takes uphill, the number of directions leading higher is cut by
a constant fraction... so it becomes ever harder to keep improving." Id. at 178. Kauffman
explains that "[a] very simple law governs such long-jump adaptations. The result, exactly
mimicking adaptive walks via fitter single-mutant variants on random landscapes is this:
every time one finds a fitter long-jump variant, the expected number of tries to find a sti/
better long-jump variant doubles!" Id. at 193. Thus, "[a]s this exponential slowing of the ease
and rate of finding distant fitter variants occurs, then it becomes easier to find fitter vari-
ants on the local hills nearby." Id. at 195. The rule of thumb, therefore, is that "[a]s fitness
increases, search closer to home. On a correlated landscape, nearby positions have similar
fitnesses. Distant positions can have fitnesses very much higher and very much lower. Thus
optimal search distance is high when fitness is low and decreases as fitness increases." Id. at
196 (providing Figure 9.2 as graphical illustration).
For example, long before complexity theory emerged, scientists devoted consider-
able thought to the diminishing returns and irreversibility of effects associated with the
entropy of energy. According to the Second Law of Thermodynamics, energy - that with
which work is done - in the universe is constant and entropy - the measure of inability
to do work with that energy - in the universe is always increasing towards its ultimate
maximum value, the state of thermodynamic equilibrium. See COVENEY & HIGHFIELD, supra
note 24, at 147-81 (discussing alternate theories of thermodynamics). Many scientists point
to this property as the basis for the nonreversibiity, or arrow, of time, though even this
proposition has not been free of controversy. See, eg., HUW PRICE, TIME'S ARROW AND
ARCHIMEDES' PoiNT 22-43 (1996) (tracing early developments in thermodynamic theory).
The classical view has been that thermodynamic equilibrium is also the point of maximum
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landscape model offers a unifying theoretical perspective for all
such applications. The implications this property of fitness land-
scapes has for law is the subject of the remainder of this Article.
B. Lessons for the Law on Diminishing Returns and Increasing
Risks in Complex Adaptive Systems
The general model of system change offered by complexity
theory fits the sociolegal system. Whether that fit is direct or
simply one of analogy, the model provides a new and powerful
analytical tool for assessing the process of sociolegal evolution.
Researchers in other disciplines embraced the model long be-
fore legal theorists have. They have been using the model to
make important findings about the fate of complex structure
and behavior in various settings, including proteins,66 immune
systems," brain circuits," economies,' cultures," and
disorder. However, beginning with Ilya Prigogine in the 1940s, a number of researchers
have questioned whether entropy and disorder have any necessary ultimate relation. See,
e.g., KAUFFMAN, supra note 2, at 20-21 (examining contrast between systems in equilibrium
and nonequilibrium); MICHAEL MACKEY, TIME'S ARROW: THE ORIGINS OF THERMODYNAMIC
BEHAVIOR 101 (1992) (stating that quest for dynamic foundations of thermodynamics and
functioning of second law is far from over); see generally COVENEY & HIGHFIELD, supra note
24, at 206-07 (suggesting that structure can spontaneously emerge from disorder); Jim
HOUGAN, DECADENCE (1975) (suggesting that industrial society is doomed to unavoidable
collapse); PRICE, supra, at 40-48 (discussing possibility that entropy will decrease toward
future). We tend towards the view, which we posit from the implications of Chaitin's work
on provable truths in axiomatic systems, that the arrow of any continuously transient (con-
stantly perturbed) nonlinear system has a direction. See Chaitin, A Random Walk supra note
31, at 196 (asserting that possibility of chaos is ever-present factor). With every change in
the system state such a perturbation generates, the number of components in the axiomat-
ic system that defines the physical system necessarily increases and renders any prior set of
truths, including those along the earlier trajectory, obsolete and incalculable. We connect
the increase in entropy of the physical system with this increase in the structural complexity
of the axiomatic system. In other words, once the system is perturbed, it has a richer set of
provable truths but leaves where it was behind forever. Whether it has thus moved closer to
order or disorder is a different question. See RuhI, Brief Discussions, supra note 3.
" See Hans Frauenfelder, Proteins as Adaptive Complex Systems, in CoMPLEXrIY:
METAPHORS, MODELS, AND REALrIY, sqpra note 2, at 179 (applying model to study of
protein function and control); Maureane Hoffman et al., Blood Coagulation is a Complex
System, in 1993 LECrURES IN COMPLEX SYSTEMS, supra note 46, at 487 (portraying blood
coagulation as complex system).
67 See Alan S. Perelson, Two Theoretical Problems in Immunology: AIDS and Epitopes, in
COMPLEXITY: METAPHORS, MODELS, AND REALrIY, supra note 2, at 185 (applying model to
problems in immune system interactions).
"' See Olaf Sporns, Neural Models of Perception and Behavior, in 1993 LECTURES IN
COMPLEX SYSTEMS, supra note 46, at 171 (applying model to brain function and behavior);
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ecosystems.7' To illustrate how those findings might be
transported to legal theory, we focus on advancements in
theories of archaeology and technology. These applications are
particularly important to refining the model of law as a complex
adaptive system.
1. Archaeology - Decreasing Returns and the Collapse of
Complexly Structured Societies
One of the great questions of archaeology has been why soci-
eties fail. The archaeological record shows that "[h]uman history
as a whole has been characterized by a seemingly inexorable
trend toward higher levels of complexity, specialization, and
sociopolitical control, processing of greater quantities of energy
and information, formation of ever larger settlements, and devel-
opment of more complex and capable technologies."' One
might reasonably imagine that lasting social stability comes with
such increasing structural complexity. In fact, "[c]ollapse is a
recurrent feature of human societies." 
7
Charles F. Stevens, Complexity of Brain Circuits, in COMPLEXITY: METAPHORS, MODELS, AND
REALTY, supra note 2, at 245 (applying model to analysis of brain functions).
" See W. Brian Arthur, On the Evolution of Complexity, in COMPLEXITY: METAPHORS,
MODELS, AND REALrIY, supra note 2, at 65 (applying model to discussion of evolution, using
examples from economics); Philip E. Auerswald &Jan Tai Tsung Kim, Transitional Dynamics
in a Model of Economic Geography, in 1993 LECTURES IN COMPLEX SYSTEMS, supra note 46, at
415 (applying model to study of transitional dynamics and evolution of economic systems).
" See Marcus W. Feldman et al., On the Complexity of Cultural Transmission and Evolution,
in COMPLEXI ': METAPHORS, MODELS, AND REALIY, supra note 2, at 47 (applying model in
study of transmission and evolution of cultural traits); Liane M. Gabora, Meme and
Variations: A Computational Model of Cultural Evolution, in 1993 LECTURES IN COMPLEX
SYSTEMS, supra note 46, at 471 (applying model to study of cultural evolution).
"' SeeJames H. Brown, Complex Ecological Systems, in COMPLEXITY: METAPHORS, MODELS,
AND REArIY, supra note 2, at 419 (applying model to study of ecological complexity);
Robert Costanza, Modeling Complex Ecological Economic Systems: Toward an Evolutionary,
Dynamic Understanding of People and Nature, 43 BIOSCIENCE 545, 545 (1993).
n TAINTER, supra note 4, at 3.
" Id. at 5. Collapse is principally a political process occurring when a society "displays a
rapid, significant loss of an established level of sociopolitical complexity." Id. at 4. Collapse
is manifested by such effects as
a lower degree of stratification and social differentiation; less economic and
occupational specialization, of individuals, groups, and territories; less central-
ized control; that is, less regulation and integration of diverse economic and
political groups by elites; less behavioral control and regimentation; less invest-
ment in the epiphenomena of complexity, those elements that define the con-
19971
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Could it be that increasing the complexity of social structure,
at some level, undermines adaptive social behavior and thus
leads, ultimately, to the collapse of the society? Indeed, that is
the thesis emerging from applications of complexity theory in
archaeology. Joseph Tainter, a leading researcher of this ques-
tion, has meticulously studied structural complexity and behav-
ioral collapse in societies throughout history, and has found
remarkable correlations between the two. This counterintuitive
finding - structural complexity is associated with behavioral
collapse - holds important implications for law's role in society.
Tainter explains that structural complexity "is generally under-
stood to refer to such things as the size of a society, the num-
ber and distinctiveness of its parts, the variety of specialized
roles that it incorporates, the number of distinct social personal-
ities present, and the variety of mechanisms for organizing these
into a coherent, functioning whole."74 A complex society thus
can be measured by its levels of such factors as inequality (the
differentiation and unequal access to material and social resourc-
es) and heterogeneity (the number of distinctive parts or
subcomponents and the distribution of the population among
them).' Societies experience these and other traits of structural
complexity as they attempt to solve the stresses confronting
them. For problems of nutrition, they establish agricultural prac-
tices; for problems of aggression, they establish a military; for
problems of resource distribution, they establish economies; for
problems of communication, they establish media; for problems
of organization, they establish a means of governance; and so
on. Hence, "[c]omplex societies are problem-solving organiza-
tions, in which more parts, different kinds of parts, more social
cept of 'civilization': monumental architecture, artistic and literary
achievements, and the like; less flow of information between individuals, be-
tween political and economic groups, and between a center and its periphery,
less sharing, trading, and redistribution of resources; less overall coordination
and organization of individuals and groups; a smaller territory integrated with-





HeinOnline  -- 30 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 438 1996-1997
1997] The Arrow of the Law
differentiation, more inequality, and more kinds of centralization
and control emerge as circumstances require."
76
Although "there is no point on the scale at which complexity
can be said to emerge,"77 Tainter's detailed review of major
societies in history demonstrates that those which achieved a
level of lasting success all experienced high levels of inequality
and heterogeneity associated with highly developed social struc-
tures. However, each such society eventually collapsed because of
the very complexity that initially led to its success.7' While oth-
er theories have explained how collapse occurred in a particular
society, Tainter has "develop[ed] a general explanation of col-
lapse, applicable to a variety of contexts, and with implications
for current conditions."' Complexity theory provides this expla-
nation.'
76 Id. at 37.
Id. at 5.
See id. at 5-18. The list of collapsed societies Tainter describes include the Western
Chou Chinese dynasty (1122-771 B.C.); the Harappans of the Indus Valley (2400-1750
B.C.); the city states of Mesopotamia (2350-614 B.C.); the Egyptian Old Kingdom (3100-
2181 B.C.); the Hittite Empire (1792-1200 B.C.); the Minoan civilization of Crete (2000-
1380 B.C.); the Mycenaean civilization of Greece (1650-1050 B.C.); the Western Roman
Empire (300 B.C.-476 A.D.); the Olmec civilization of Mexico (1000-400 B.C.); the lowland
Mayan civilization (1000 B.C.-900 A.D.); the Mesoamerican Highland civilization of Mexico
(600-1200 A.D.); Casas Grandes in Mexico (1060-1340 A.D.); the Chacoans of the New
Mexico area (500-1300 A.D.); the Hohokam of the Arizona desert (1300-1500 A.D.); the
Eastern Woodlands civilizations of North America (200 B.C.-1250 A.D.); the Huari and
Tiahuanaco Empires of Peru (200 B.C.-1l00 A.D.); the Kachin of Burma (ongoing); and
the Ik of Uganda (ongoing). See id. at 5-18.
' Id. at 3. Tainter describes other theories of collapse which have been used to ex-
plain how this occurred. Identifying 11 major themes of analyses, he finds them all unsatis-
factory in that they "focus on a particular society or civilization, rather than approach the
global process [of collapse]." See id. at 42-90. The different themes focus on resource deple-
tion; new resources; catastrophes; insufficient response to circumstances; other complex
societies; intruders; conflict, contradictions, and mismanagement; social dysfunction; the
mystical; chance concatenation of events; and economic explanations. See id. at 42. Howev-
er, Tainter believes the general explanation of collapse must subsume the 11 themes that
have been dominant in other theories of collapse, so that one can account for what is
worthwhile in each. See i& at 90. It is his effort to do so which has won his book much
acclaim among his peers. See, e.g., P. Nick Kardulias, The Collapse of Complex Societies, by Joseph
Tainter, 93 AM. J. ARcHAEoLoGY 599, 600-01 (1989) (book review).
' In his original treatment of the subject, Tainter did not explicitly correspond his
definition and analysis of social complexity to complexity in the dynamical systems sense,
though the two are compatible. See supra notes 4-5 (explaining how sociolegal system can
be portrayed as complex adaptive system and how findings of complexity theory can con-
tribute to understanding of system behavior and evolution). In his more recent work,
Tainter has provided the textual links between complexity theory and his archaeological
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By reexamining the history of social collapse with complexity
theory's insights into system dynamics, Tainter identified four
qualities of complex social structures that he believes lead to
behavioral collapse of social systems. These qualities are the
following: (1) human societies are problem-solving organizations;
(2) sociopolitical systems require energy for their maintenance;
(3) increased structural complexity carries with it increased costs
per capita; and (4) investment in sociopolitical structure as a
problem-solving response often reaches a point of diminishing
returns.8
Using the historical record to unfold his theory,2 Tainter
describes how the convergence of the first three of these fea-
tures leads to the fourth. Initially, societies increase in structural
complexity and use more energy to do so along the way.8 One
sector of the society, such as the economy, cannot increase in
structural complexity without the support of others, such as
technology and communications. A society thus becomes more
highly structured as a system through "the interlinked growth of
the several subsystems that comprise a society."84 The problem-
solving qualities of this investment in social structure, however,
research. See Joseph A. Tainter, Prehistoric Societies as Evolving Complex Systems, in EVOLVING
COMPLEXrIY AND ENVIRONMENTAL RISK IN THE PREHisTORic SOuTHWEST 1, 3-4 (Joseph A.
Tainter & Bonnie Bagley Tainter eds., 1996).
" See TAINTER, supra note 4, at 93.
See id. at 93-126 (stating that four qualities provide explanations for societal col-
lapse).
82 See i&. at 119. Tainter provides the example that when
complexity increases to regulate regional subsistence production, investments
will be made in hierarchy, in bureaucracy, and in agricultural facilities (such as
irrigation networks). The expanding hierarchy requires still further agricultural
output for its own needs, as well as increased investment in energy and miner-
als extraction. An expanded military is needed to protect the assets thus creat-
ed, requiring in turn its own increased sphere of agricultural and other re-
sources. As more and more resources are drained from the support population
to maintain this system, an increased share must be allocated to legitimization
or coercion. This increased complexity requires specialized administrators, who
consume further shares of subsistence resources and wealth. To maintain the
productive capacity of the base population, further investment is made in agri-
culture, and so on.
84 Id.
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are not boundless. Rather, they exhibit a cost-benefit relation-
ship that exists within outer-bound limits of declining marginal
returns.8
A society is in trouble when the feature of declining marginal
returns emerges. When "investment in further complexity yields
increased returns, but at a declining marginal rate, . . . a com-
plex society enters a phase where it becomes increasingly vulner-
able to collapse."' Eventually, a society facing this dilemma
reaches a point at which adding complexity becomes a less at-
tractive problem-solving strategy." As the marginal costs of
complexity begin to exceed its benefits, "productive units across
the economic spectrum increase resistance (passive or active) to
the demands of the hierarchy, or overtly attempt to break
away."8 The society's final gasp is reached when "increasing
complexity may actually bring decreased overall benefits, as the
See iU at 19-20. Tainter explains the underlying forces creating the cost-benefit rela-
tionship as follows:
[S]ociety... responds to stress by increasing complexity. In so doing, it in-
creases investment in agricultural and other resource production, in hierarchy,
in information processing, in education and specialized training, in defense,
and so forth. The cost-benefit curves for these investments increases at first
favorably, for the easiest, most general, most accessible, and least expensive
solutions are attempted first. As these solutions are exhausted, however, contin-
ued stresses require further investments in complexity. The least costly solu-
tions having been used, evolution now proceeds in a more expensive direction.
The hierarchy expands in size, complexity, and specialization; resource produc-
tion focuses increasingly on sources of supply that are more difficult to acquire
and process; agricultural labor intensifies; information processing and training
requirements become less generalized; and, most likely, an increased military
apparatus is seen as the solution to these problems.
Id. at 120.
Id. As Tainter explains:
To meet... major stresses the society must have some kind of net reserve.
This can take the form of excess productive capacities in agriculture, energy, or
minerals, or hoarded surpluses from past production. Stress surges of great
magnitude cannot be accommodated without such a reserve. Yet a society expe-
riencing declining marginal returns is investing ever more heavily in a strategy
that is yielding proportionately less. Excess productive capacity will at some
point be used up, and accumulated surpluses allocated to current needs. There
is, then, little or no surplus with which to counter major adversities.
Id. at 120-21.
7 See id. at 121.
88 1
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economic system and the sustaining base are taxed to the point
where productivity declines. All segments of the society compete
for a shrinking economic product. This is the realm of extreme
vulnerability." 9 Indeed, Tainter believes that every complexly
structured society in history reached this point and, ultimately,
collapsed as a result. The principle of declining returns on in-
vestment in social structure thus provides the general theory of
social behavioral collapse for which Tainter was searching.
Although we must consider the danger of squeezing history to
fit a new theory, Tainter tests his theory against the historical
record in excruciating detail." Moreover, his specific applica-
tion also squares neatly with the predictions of the general com-
plexity theory model - that system adaptiveness increases near
the border between order and chaos and decreases as a system
moves out of that balance into either extreme. As the general
complexity theory model of system evolution predicts, with each
addition of structural complexity in one sector of society, the
fitness landscape of systems elsewhere in society change. These
systems may in turn require investment in structure just to stay
current. And each step up the fitness landscape gained by the
overall social investment in structural complexity reduces the
chances that an equal additional investment in structure will
lead to another equal step up the fitness landscape. Therefore,
each new investment in structural complexity has less chance of
benefitting the system equally or more than the last investment.
Further, the investment creates more opportunities for emer-
gence of unforeseen properties in system behavior. Tainter's
work in archaeology has suggested that these principles hold
true for human social systems.91
Although Tainter does not focus specifically on law, it clearly
is at the core of the dynamics he unveils. Collapse for Tainter is
' Id. at 122.
See id. at 127-92 (discussing Western Roman Empire, Classic Maya, and Chacoan).
" Political theorists studying more recent history believe there is ample evidence of
the most acute effect of diminishing returns on advanced state systems. See, e.g., MASTERS,
supra note 4, at 185-212. Masters uses evolutionary social biology and inclusive fitness theo-
ry to diagnose modern bureaucratic states. See id. Because of the strong parallels between
his social evolution method and complexity theory, see supra note 62 and accompanying
text, it comes as no surprise that Masters's analysis of ancient complex societies is compati-
ble with Tainter's.
442 [Vol. 30:405
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a political process,92 and law is one of the raw ingredients in
sociopolitical complexity.93 So, because it necessarily is part of
the larger adaptive social system, law must play a role in the
theory of declining returns on investment in social structure. We
can modify Tainter's four features to focus on law: (1) human
societies use law as a tool of the problem-solving organization;
(2) legal systems require energy for their maintenance, in such
forms as courts, codes, lawyers, legislatures, regulatory and en-
forcement agencies, and other apparatus of legal institutions
designed to distribute legal justice; (3) increased structural com-
plexity of law and its institutions carries with it increased legal
costs per capita; and thus (4) investment in the structures of the
legal system as a problem-solving response can lead to declining
marginal returns on law's benefits.
Society may think that the next incremental law is very impor-
tant for solving a particular problem. But when law and society
in general have become highly structured, each new law has
effects, some of which are unanticipated and unintended. These
effects spread out beyond the law's specific target to add yet
more structural complexity (including its defining social charac-
teristics of inequality and heterogeneity) to society. Whatever its
effect on the target, the impacts of the law throughout society,
as well as the increased complexity it adds to the system (and
thus energy it drains from the system), must be included in the
analysis of its overall effects. Any new law added to the pot of
existing laws is likely on average to produce less marginal net
benefits to society than did the previous law. Lawmakers in a
complexly structured society must deal with the law of declining
returns.
See TAINTER, supra note 4, at 4 (stating collapse is political process).
See id. (enumerating characteristics of collapse). Several other legal commentators
have focused on the link between the burgeoning of law and social collapse, principally in
descriptive terms. See, e.g., Bruce Bartlett, How Excessive Government Killed Ancient Rome, 14
CATO J. 287 (1994) (identifying Roman economic policies as main factor contributing to
end of economic and political stability); John W. Ragsdale, Jr., The Rise and Fall of the
Chacoan State, 64 UMKC L REV. 485 (1996) (discussing rise and fall of ancient Chaco Can-
yon civilization).
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2. Technology - Increasing Risk as the Price
of Convenience
Focusing on why societies experience decreasing returns on
their investment in problem-solving structural complexity,
Tainter's archaeological theory includes among the indicia of
social structure and behavioral collapse the degree and pace of
technological advancement." Others who have considered the
role of technology in society, particularly those researchers who
have used complexity theory to explain the process of techno-
logical advancement, have reached conclusions remarkably simi-
lar to Tainter's. Indeed, perhaps more than any other aspect of
society, technology offers a clear lesson about the chaotic fragili-
ty that can be experienced in a complexly structured society -
a lesson that we believe has obvious applications to law.
Technological advancement is a nonlinear process. Technolo-
gy is often portrayed in reductionist terms as progressing
through discrete time and theme phases and through the efforts
of individual "inventors." But, as James Burke concludes in his
epic study of the technological developments that have shaped
modern society, this is seldom the case.95 Burke's detailed histo-
ry of events shaping technological change shows that these peri-
odic, thematic, and heroic treatments tend to ignore the over-
lapping nature of so-called periods. Instead, these portrayals
imply a degree of foreknowledge where none exists, and exag-
gerate the influence of individuals over events.' In reality, the
triggering factor in technological advancement "is more often
than not operating in an area entirely unconnected with the
situation which is about to undergo change."97 A linear view of
technological change misses many of the major points and dis-
torts what it does reveal.9'
1 See TANTER, supra note 4, at 123-24 (discussing technical innovation in different
societies).
SeeJA ES BURKE, CONNECTIONS 288 (1978).
9 See id.
97 Id, at 289.
Burke points out that
[a] linear view of the past would, for instance, place the arrival of the chimney
in a sequence of developments relating to change in domestic living. Yet the
alteration of life-style brought about by the chimney included year-round ad-
ministration and increased intellectual activity, which in turn contributed to a
[Vol. 30:405
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The reductionist, linear view of the past also influences our
understanding of how technological advancement influences
society, both in the present and future, in what Edward Tenner
calls the perils of extrapolation.99 For example, when eminent
American men and women were asked in 1893 to describe life
in 1993, many correctly anticipated weapons of mass destruction
and global communication, but none foresaw the rise of the
automobile. Indeed, the automobile seemed a rather impractical,
expensive contraption until the discovery of oil in Texas in 1901
led to cheap gasoline and a fire at the Olds plant in Detroit
that same year prompted Olds to create the assembly line pro-
cess in its new plant. l" Similarly, throughout history, despite
the prevailing linear conception, the major events of technologi-
cal advancement are the result of "a fascinating mixture of acci-
dent, climactic change, genius, craftsmanship, careful observa-
tion, ambition, greed, war, religious belief, deceit, and a hun-
dred other factors."" 1 We have every reason to believe the fu-
ture will unfold in like fashion.
Technology's nonlinear evolution suggests that technological
advancement may exhibit the behavior of a complex adaptive
system. To some extent this is intuitive through simple observa-
tion of the historical record Burke and other researchers have
revealed. Long before complexity theory hit the scene, for exam-
ple, the philosopher Jim Hougan described technology in terms
reminiscent of the strange attractor model.0 More recently,
general increase in the economic welfare of the community to a point where
the increase in the construction of houses brought about a shortage of wood.
The consequent need for alternative sources of energy spurred the develop-
ment of a furnace which would operate efficiently on coal, and this led to the
production of molten iron in large quantities, permitting the casting of the
cylinders which were used in the early steam engines.
Id. Burke's wonderfully written book carries the reader through the decidedly nonlinear
development and cultural impacts of a rich variety of technologies, including clocks, looms,
buttons, money, and the zoopraxiscope. Beginning in November 1995, his writings on the
subject can be followed in monthly installments in Scientific American. SeeJames Burke, The
Silk Road, Sd. AM., Nov. 1995, at 109, 109 (explaining that "[r]eductionism simply does not
begin to describe this complex, serendipitous process [of technology innovation], in which
even apparently trivial elements have the most important effects").
91 See TENNER, supra note 8, at 272.
100 See id.
1o1 BURKE, supra note 95, at 13.
" Hougan writes:
1997]
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Stuart Kauffman has described technological change using the
core concepts of complexity theory.13 Indeed, Kauffman points
to the decreasing returns that are present in the historical re-
cord of technological change, just as Tainter has revealed that
decreasing returns are an agent at work in the social system."°
Precisely as the model of rugged fitness landscapes would pre-
dict, "the rate of finding fitter variants - of making incremental
improvements - shows exponential slowing."105 That this phe-
nomenon appears in the records of both archaeological and
technological change is difficult to ignore.
Any consideration of the technical phenomenon rapidly leads to the conclu-
sion that it's a chreod That is, a system whose components interact with each
other in such a way that the system changes as time passes; and the interactions
are of such a nature that the pathway of change is "buffered" from external
influence by its internal rules or organization; if an outside force shoves the
system in a direction contrary to its nature or rules, the system will automaticaly
redirect itself along its natural path.
HOUGAN, supra note 65, at 63. In other words, technology's response to human input often
exhibits the sensitivity property of strange attractor systems. However, technology is suffi-
ciendy adaptive as a system to resist human efforts to control it over the long run.
' Kauffman, whose work adapting complexity theory to evolutionary biology has been
highly influential, posits that
[bloth organisms and artifacts confront conflicting design constraints. As
shown, it is those constraints that create rugged fitness landscapes. Evolution
explores its landscapes without the benefit of intention. We explore the land-
scapes of technological opportunity with intention, under the selective pressure
of market forces. But if the underlying design problems result in similar rugged
landscapes of conflicting constraints, it would not be astonishing if the same
laws governed both biological and technological evolution.
KAUFFMAN, supra note 2, at 192. Although society explores technology with "intent," we
question whether the decision to explore is voluntary. Does society have a choice?
104 Kauffman explains that
during the initial phase of rapid improvements, investment in the new technol-
ogy yields rapid improvement in performance. This can yield what economists
call increasing returns, which attract investment and drive further innovation.
Later, when learning slows, little improvement occurs per investment dollar,
and the mature technology is in a period of what economists call diminishing
returns. Attracting capital for further innovation becomes more difficult.
Growth of that technology sector slows, markets saturate, and further growth
awaits a burst of fundamental innovation in some other sector.
Id. at 203. Of course, some technologies simply die out when "attacked" by competing
technologies. See Carl W.I. Pistorious & James M. Utterback, The Death Knells of Mature Tech-
nologies, 50 TECH. FORECASTING & SOC. CHANGE 133 (1995).
105 KAUFFMAN, supra note 2, at 204.
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The implications of this view of technology lead inevitably to
consideration of how society responds to the presence of emer-
gence, chaos, sensitivity, and catastrophe in relation to techno-
logical change. Most of our modem technology is highly inter-
dependent and beyond the average person's understanding."°6
When technology "goes wrong," therefore, society is vulnerable
to unintended and unanticipated consequences having no readi-
ly apparent remedies. Tenner dubs this the "revenge effect,"
10 7
and explains that a machine can only be understood when it is
viewed as "a system, not just a device. It needs parts that inter-
act in unexpected and sometimes unstable and unwanted
ways."10 8 The behavior of technology cannot be predicted be-
cause "[t]he complexity of mechanical systems makes it impossi-
ble to test for all possible malfunctions and makes it inevitable
that in actual use, some great flaws will appear that were hidden
from designers.""°  Tenner observes that as technology be-
comes tightly coupled - highly interdependent - "[c]omplexity
makes it impossible for anyone to understand how the system
might act; tight coupling spreads problems once they begin.""'
'" Look around the room in which you are reading this Article. Can you explain how
all of the apparatus in the room works? Could you build all of it from scratch? See BuRKE,
supra note 95, at 6 (hypothesizing what individuals would do if they had to start over after
massive system failure).
107 TENNER, supra note 8, at 7-9. Tenner is joined by several other current-day authors
writing on the subject of society's increasing vulnerability to increasingly slight perturba-
tions in technology. See, e.g., DIETRICH DiRNER, THE LOGIC OF FAILURE: WHY THINGS Go
WRONG AND WHAT WE CAN DO TO MAKE THEM RIGHT (1996); IVARS PETERSON, FATAL DE-
FECT: CHASING KILLER COMPUTER BuGS (1996). This emerging body of literature is chang-
ing perceptions of risk management methods and expectations of how successful risk man-
agement can be. SeeJohn Adams, Mistakes Were Made, So. Am., Oct. 1996, at 120, 120-22
(reviewing Edward Tenner and Dietrich D6rner). The literature is also leading social com-
mentators to reexamine the importance of the unanticipated consequences of social action.
See David Whitman, The Law of Welcome Surprises, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 30, 1996,
at 78.
1' TENNER, supra note 8, at 13.
109 Id.
10 Id. at 16. Burke offers the example of the 1965 power outage in the northeastern
United States as an illustration of how "failure in one area can mean failure in all areas."
See BURKE, supra note 95, at 2. Hougan also has captured this quality of highly advanced
technologies, positing that
[t]he fragility of contemporary technique, its total dependence upon an in-
creasing number of components, its accelerating complexificatio, increases the
probable magnitude of any technical disruption we may experience. When
anything is changed in such a whole-system as our own, everything is
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Illustrating this effect, Tenner documents example after example
of a supposedly beneficial technological event - the invention
of a device designed to improve safety or the introduction of a
predator species to eradicate a pest species - having disastrous
consequences outside (and often inside) the intended target
zone of the technological "breakthrough.""' He concludes that
this technological backlash is so prevalent today that society has
come to accept a certain background level of technological
vulnerability. As a result, to be counted as a "catastrophe," the
tragic event must register on the global rather than local
scale."
12
Society's vulnerability to technology raises important themes
similar to those Tainter developed in his studies of the archaeo-
logical record. As Burke has observed, society's response to
problems associated with technology is usually to increase tech-
nology because that is what society knows best how to do, and
that is what was done before.'" Technological advancement
changed.... It seems reasonable to suppose that, as the whole-system's func-
tioning comes to depend upon more and more parts, it becomes increasingly
likely that the system will break down, assuming the fragility of each part re-
mains about the same.
HOUGAN, supra note 65, at 45.
M See TENNER, supra note 8, at 26-253 (recounting incidents in medicine, environment,
pest control, computerization, and sports).
"' Tenner concludes from the historical record that
[I]ooking back over the last two hundred years, we can see a pattern. The nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries were an age of crisis, a time when people
were awed by technological scale and intensity, when people would come at
great expense to world's fairs to ogle steam engines, and when artists painted
new furnaces and forges in romantically outsized dimensions.... The combi-
nation of scale and the complexity of technological systems guaranteed that
catastrophes happened far more often than they had in previous centuries....
Classic disasters were deterministic. Cause and effect were linked. An exploding
boiler killed those it killed, and spared those it spared. Late-twentieth-century
disasters are expressed as deviations from a baseline of "normal" background
tragedy. The truth is not in immediate view. It emerges from the statistical
inference of trained professionals; to see it, lay people must learn at least the
basics of their language. The old disasters were localized and sudden. New ones
may be global and gradual, from radioactive isotopes in milk in the 1950s to
climate change in the 1990s.
Id. at 24-25.
"' As Burke stated:
[Vol. 30:405
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breeds yet more technological advancement. Tenner calls this
the "intensiveness" effect - addressing disaster by intensifying
the technological apparatus." 4 Because of decreasing returns
on that investment, however, each successive wave of investment
requires more intensity to yield the same payoff.
This is precisely the theme Tainter develops in connection
with collapse of societies generally. As Tainter's decreasing re-
turns theory would predict, social vulnerability to technology
increases as technological complexity increases. As early as the
mid-1970s, foretelling Tainter's archaeological theme of central-
ization of power in society, Hougan suggested that society's in-
creasing vulnerability to technology could lead to "the gradual
surrender of popular authority to technical elites within the
administrative, or military, branches of government."' When
viewing technology through the complexity theory model of
complex adaptive systems, therefore, society's responses to tech-
nological advancement appear only to exacerbate the predicted
emergence, chaos, sensitivity, and catastrophe behaviors.
11 6
[M]ost of us take the only available course: we ignore the vulnerability of our
position, since we have no choice but to do so. We seek the security in the
routines imposed by the technological systems which structure our lives into
periods of work and rest. In spite of the fact that any breakdown in our inter-
dependent world will spread like ripples in a pool, we do not believe the break-
down will occur. Even when it does .... our first reaction is to presume that
the fault will be rectified, and that technology will, as it always has, come to the
rescue.
BURKE, supra note 95, at 6.
"4 SeeTENNER, supra note 8, at 273-74 (discussing "intensification" and interplay among
nature, society, and technology). Hougan refers to this response as part of the social "tech-
nique" of managing technology, under which "the natural path of the system as a whole is
toward the most efficient rationalization of all activity in every area of endeavor." HOUGAN,
supra note 65, at 63. Continuing technological improvement towards the goal of rational
efficiency becomes the central tenet of the social technique, such that "most people are
unable to distinguish between technical innovation and 'progress.'" Id. at 64. When tech-
nical innovation and social progress become synonymous in society's perception, Tenner's
intensification effect is inevitable. Although it may seem trite to observe how fast technolo-
gy has "progressed" in recent history, the fact of the matter is that the pace of technologi-
cal evolution is breathtaking compared to evolution in biological systems. See W. Brian
Arthur, How Fast Is Technology Evolving?, Sci. AM., Feb. 1997, at 105, 105, 107. We contend
that when social perceptions of legal innovation and progress merge a similar "intensifica-
tion effect" leading to rapid legal evolution also occurs.
11 HouGAN, supra note 65, at 185.
16 We are not advocating as a solution to this phenomenon any form of active attempt
to "reverse" technological advancement, as that could be as unpredictable in outcome and
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Could this insight on the effects of technology have some
application to law? We believe so. On one level, law contributes
to the technological revenge effect when it endorses or pro-
motes a particular technological development, for "only when we
anchor [technology] in laws, regulations, customs, and habits
does an irony reach its full potential."" 7 On another level,
however, the lesson from technology says something about law
itself, in that the overall level of sociolegal structure can be
understood as carrying with it an analogous interdependence.
The success of any one law depends on the proper functioning
of the many other laws. The catapult for carrying law to that
point, we believe, is the federal administrative state.
The increasing centralization of power that has been a charac-
teristic of the federal administrative state tends to decouple legal
policy decision-making by promoting stratified, reductionist legal
institutions, such as specialized federal agencies."' The various
arms of the central state, endlessly proliferating and effectively
thus as risk prone as the alternative of unchecked technological transformation. See BURKE,
supra note 95, at 293. As complexity theory demonstrates, there is no way for society to
alter technological advancement while all else remains the same, nor is there any way of
knowing what would not remain the same and how it would change. Rather, the focus
must be on how society can arrange itself as a system so as to best manage the effects of
sub-systems such as technology and, the subject of this Article, law.
17 TENNER, supra note 8, at 7. In other words, often law mandates or gives preference
to the use of a certain technology, thereby decreasing the ability of society to reject the
technology in the event it poses unanticipated adverse effects. For example, some commen-
tators posit that the tradition in pollution control laws of prescribing technology-based
regulatory standards "tend[s] to freeze technological improvements and stifle innovation."
SeeJohn Atcheson, Can We Trust Verification, ENVTL. F., July-Aug. 1996, at 15, 17.
"' In the environmental law field, for example, there are over 15 congressional com-
mittees, over 50 executive branch agencies, and at least 8 independent agencies, each with
some jurisdiction over a defined set of environmental issues. See NATIONAL WIDiuFE FEDER-
ATION, 1996 CONSERVATION DIREcroRY (41st ed. 1996). Professor Jerry Anderson has ob-
served that
environmental law is hopelessly muddled because Congress focused on individ-
ual environmental problems rather than the environment as a whole. The
piecemeal approach - responding to each separate crisis and treating distinct
resources separately and differently - simply has not worked very well. Envi-
ronmental law cries out for coordination and integration in order to be more
effective.
Jerry L. Anderson, The Environmental Revolution at Twenty-Fve, 26 RuTGERS LJ. 395, 410
(1995); see also Futrell, supra note 59, at §§ 3.1-3.5 (stating that "this 'piecemealism' has
resulted in a checkerboard pattern of conflicting, confused overregulation for some activi-
ties and gaps where major environmental insults go unchecked by the law").
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isolated from each other, thus become extremely skilled at
promulgating laws. But a decision to make law by any one sub-
sub-sector (for example, an agency with jurisdiction over health
care) is not sensitive to decisions made elsewhere in the system
(for example, an agency with jurisdiction over transportation).
As this fractionalization persists, the number of entities making
law increases, and they become separated from each other and
from their total environment. Each entity increasingly focuses on
its own jurisdictional "turf." Its performance is measured by how
many laws or the legal results it produces in that narrow realm,
more being better. As a result, the law-making system becomes
increasingly fixed (as in fixed point attractor behavior) on doing
one thing - making laws."' The system eventually begins to
ooze laws.
As the sheer "mass" of laws grows, however, a reverse of
decoupling happens at another level of social structure. The
multitude of laws becomes fully interactive as their fabric be-
comes increasingly intertwined with other social institutions. This
interconnection is not the result of any conscious design, but
.. For example, Professor Jerry Anderson reports, presumably based on first-hand ex-
perimentation, that "[i]f you stack on the floor the volumes of the Code of Federal Regula-
tions that contain environmental regulations, they measure over three and a half feet
high." Anderson, supra note 118, at 413. He reports further that "[t]he EPA alone pub-
lished almost 3500 pages of proposed and final regulations in the Federal Register during
the first six months of 1994," and that the many federal agencies with some environmental
jurisdiction combined "churn out over 35 pages of new or proposed regulations every work-
ing day." Id. Similarly, Professor William H. Rodgers reports that EPA's RCRA program fills
697 pages of the Code of Federal Regulations and 19,500 pages of informal guidance. See
William H. Rodgers, Jr., Environmental Law Trivia Test No. 2, 22 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.
807, 812, 816 (1995). These pages of law translate into a measurable labor and capital
compliance burden. See, e.g., Soures Spend 5.3 Million Hours Meeting Operating Permit Require-
ments, EPA Says, 27 Env't Rep. (BNA) 987 (1996) (reporting statistics based on study of
25,659 sources of air pollution); NSP Information Collection Requirements Top 46,000 Hours
Annually for Gas Producers, 27 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1342 (1996) (reporting statistics based on
study of 332 facilities subject to specific federal air pollution controls). The burgeoning
administrative state is by no means limited to environmental law. For example, Professor
Richard Epstein reports that, largely as a result of the expansion of administrative powers
and rules, the annual pages of the Federal Register have grown in number from 2,411 in
1936 to 67,716 in 1991. See RiCHARD EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 7
(1995). Professor Bernard Schwartz notes that in 1989, "to check all the federal regula-
tions, one had to search the Code of Federal Regulations, with its 196 paperback volumes,
containing 122,090 pages. The C.F.R. now contains over 60 million words - about seventy
times as many as in the Bible and sixty times as many as in a complete Shakespeare." See
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 168 (3d ed. 1991).
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develops from the undercurrents of emergent properties in
society. As society begins to structure itself based on the large
and growing volume of laws, society's success increasingly de-
pends on the success of laws in meeting their goals. Thus, the
system reaches chaotic interdependence. When any one law in
such a complexly structured legal system fails to work as
planned, society is vulnerable to more than just the failure of
that law. Society is also faced with the unpredictable ripple ef-
fects the law's failure will have on the proper functioning of
many other laws and, consequently, the other social institutions
with which the laws are intertwined. As this failure reverberates
through the legal system, society responds with more inherently
(but not intentionally) interdependent laws designed to patch
up the system, adding to the vulnerability of the system. Struc-
tural complexity breeds vulnerability, which breeds more struc-
tural complexity, which breeds more vulnerability, and so on.
II. THE MODERN ADMINISTRATIVE STATE - HAS THE
PROBLEM-SOLVER BECOME THE PROBLEM?
The applications of complexity theory in the study of archae-
ology and technology discussed in the previous Part of this Arti-
cle demonstrate that structural complexity, despite its powerful
problem-solving qualities, can lead to problems. As dependence
on a more highly developed structure increases, the return on
each incremental investment in structure decreases and the
vulnerability to system-wide behavioral failure increases. Society
responds to these problems with more investment in structural
complexity, thus exacerbating rather than relieving the cycle
towards breakdown. To determine the model's implications for
law, in this Part we explore the emergence of decreasing returns
and increasing vulnerability in a sociolegal system in which struc-
tural complexity has risen to the highest level in the history of
societies - the modern administrative state.
As accustomed as modern society is to itself, "[tihe citizens of
modern complex societies usually do not realize that we are an
anomaly of history."" ° Many disciplines of study have been fas-
'2o TAINTER, supra note 4, at 24. As Tainter explains:
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cinated with explaining the process that led to the emergence of
states. These disciplines generally agree on the major charac-
teristics of states that set them apart from other societies -
territorial organization, differentiation by class and occupation
rather than by kinship, monopoly of force, authority to mobilize
resources and personnel, and legal jurisdiction - but they dis-
agree over how these characteristics emerged from "simpler"
societies.' For example, one approach - the typological ap-
proach to explaining the process - is based on the assumption
"that as societies increase in complexity, they do so by leaps
from one structurally stable level to another." "r This approach
was taken by many eighteenth century legal theorists, such as
Adam Smith and his fellow Scottish legal thinkers,"' and
Throughout the several million years that recognizable humans are known to
have lived, the common political unit was the small, autonomous community,
acting independently, and largely self-sufficient.... It has only been within the
last 6000 years that something unusual has emerged: the hierarchical, orga-
nized, interdependent states that are the major reference for our contemporary
political experience. Complex societies, once established, tend to expand and
dominate, so that today they control most of the earth's lands and people, and
are perpetually vexed by those still beyond their reach.
Id.; see also MASTERS, supra note 4, at 198 (arguing that "while the modem nation-state may
resemble... ancient forms [of developed bureaucracies] in its bureaucratic infrastructure,
the leaders of some states or state-like systems did not rely on the kind of centralized insti-
tutions we take for granted"). References to an "administrative state" in the United States
began to proliferate in the 1940s. See, e.g., JOSEPH ROSENFARB, FREEDOM AND THE ADMINIS-
TRATIVE STATE 75 (1948) (asserting that "[w]e are on the threshold of what should be
called the administrative state").
12 TAINTER, supra note 4, at 29.
12 Id.
" Smith was a leading member of a "salon" of Scottish legal thinkers, which included
Henry Home (Lord Kames) and David Hume as other leading figures. During the late
eighteenth century, these legal scholars distinguished sharply between morality and law.
They pursued the theory, the foundations for which were laid by earlier figures such as
Montesquieu and Machiavelli, that "legal development is related to the mode of subsistence
of society, which passes through certain well-defined stages." PETER STEIN, LEGAL EVOLU-
TION: THE STORY OF AN IDEA 29 (1980). The focus of Smith in particular was on property
law, based on the premise that property plays different roles in the sociolegal system ac-
cording to the state of progress a society has reached. See id. at 29-38. "[Wlriters in the
natural law tradition ... stressed the will of the individuals involved in a transaction, and
set it against the good of the community as a whole." Id. at 39. In contrast, Smith and his
group held that
fn]atural liberty implies.., a set of laws and institutions designed to make the
self-interested actions of individual men work to the advantage of all. The ap-
propriate analogy for such laws is no longer mathematics, as it was for the
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Friedrich Karl von Savigny, leader of the German historical
school of legal evolutionary theory at the time.2 4 An alterna-
tive approach "is that as societies increase in complexity they do
so on a continuous scale, so that discrete, stable 'levels' will be
difficult to define, and indeed may not exist." " The influence
of Darwin's theory of gradual evolution by natural selection led
many legal theorists to adopt this approach in explaining legal
change.26 Each approach has its explanatory advantages, but
no theory has fully explained why states emerge and col-
lapse.'
We are not attempting to resolve all those questions, but
rather to identify the properties of law that contribute to
sociolegal evolution and, if not contained, possibly to sociolegal
collapse. The structure of law in society - its level of complexi-
ty - appears to play a role in that process. Using a typological
approach for a moment allows some correlation between the
structural complexity of legal institutions and types of societies.
We have added legal structure complexity to Tainter's heteroge-
rationalist natural law theorists. It is rather the rules of grammar, established by
a slow process of social consensus, and subject to human alteration.
Id. at 46; see also Knut Wolfgang N6rr, Technique and Substance: Remarks on the Role of Roman
Law at the End of the 20th Century, 20 SYRACUSEJ. INT'L L & CoM. 33, 34 (1994) (explaining
importance of property law to Scottish school).
.. Savigny's and Hugo's theories, like those of the Scottish school, echoed the earlier
writings of Montesquieu, as well as of the Irish theorist, Edmund Burke. See STEIN, supra
note 123, at 54-60 (naming Montesquieu and Burke as influences on Savigny's and Hugo's
writings). Hugo's fascination was with Roman law, which he regarded as evidencing a
strong "power... to adapt itself to changes in Roman society." Id. at 55. For Savigny, who
also focused on Roman law as the model of evolution in law, the Roman experience dem-
onstrated that "[Ijaw at first is not formulated in abstract rules; rather it is manifested
through special forms, symbolic acts, which create or extinguish rights and duties....
People consider them part of their special way of life." Id. at 60. Savigny thus posited that
this "organic connection of law with the character of the people is preserved as societies
develop... [and] is an inseparable part of a nation's life." Id. Savigny's "organic connec-
tion" became the dominant model of the German historical school. See id. at 63; see also
Elliott, supra note 22, at 40-43 (discussing influence of Savigny's German historical school
on Anglo-American theorists); Mathias Reimann, Nineteenth Centuy German Legal Science 31
B.C. L. REV. 837, 858 (1990) (reviewing Savigny's theories and noting that "[a]ll German
legal thinkers after Savigny built on his work").
125 TAiNTER, supra note 4, at 29.
M See STEIN, supra note 123, at 100 (describing how emerging theories of legal evolu-
tion paralleled developing theories of biological evolution).
12 See TANTER, supra note 4, at 31-38 (acknowledging inadequate understanding of rise
and collapse of complex social institutions and describing two main theories).
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neity (number of groups and evenness of distribution between
groups) and inequality factors for defining social structure com-
plexity. The resulting array of society types is as follows:2 8
Number Distribution Level complexity
Tet of Between of Legal
Groups Groups Inequality Structure
Hunter-Gatherer low even low low
Chiefdom low uneven medium medium
Modern State high uneven high high
Tyranny low uneven high high
Anarchy low uneven high low
We do this not to advance a new airtight theory of classifica-
tion of societies, but rather to make several points about the
structural complexity of sociolegal institutions." First, legal
structure complexity can help explain the difference between
'" Our reference to the hunter-gatherer, chiefdom, and complex state society types and
description of their relative levels of heterogeneity and inequality are a summation of
Tainter's more detailed descriptions. See id. at 26-31 (describing states and contrasting
states with other types of societies). We have added the comparative measure of legal com-
plexity and based our comparison of relative levels for those three society types on
Tainter's general discussion of the role of law in each. Our descriptions of the tyranny and
anarchy types of society are our inventions for illustration purposes. However, they are
based generally on Tainter's description of conditions during and after the collapse of a
number of societies. See id. at 39-90 (describing reasons for collapse of various literate soci-
eties).
2 Other commentators have found the same exercise useful as a means of exploring
the relationship between law and social structure. See, e.g., DONALD BLACK, THE BEHAVIOR
OF LAW (1976). There are strong parallels between Black's theory of legal system behavior
and the five-step cyclic model we describe in Part II.B supra. Black focuses on three law-
society relationships that bear some analogy to key ingredients of our model: vertical strati-
fication (our inequality factor), horizontal differentiation (our two heterogeneity factors),
and organization (our complex legal structure factor). See id. at 11-59, 85-103 (describing
stratification, morphology, and organization in different societies). He uses these indices to
describe types of social control structures. See id. at 105-30 (discussing methods of social
control within different societies). Where we depart from Black, however, is in the explana-
tion of the evolution of these relationships. See infra note 156 and accompanying text (ex-
plaining Black's assertion that indices allow us to forecast quantity of law that will exist in
given setting).
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types of societies, such as tyranny and anarchy, that otherwise
share characteristics used by social scientists to define social
types. Second, increasing structural complexity appears to corre-
late with increasing heterogeneity and inequality, as seen in the
array of society types from hunter-gatherer to chiefdom to com-
plex state (the exception is tyranny, in which most of the
sociolegal complexity is devoted to maintaining a privileged class
at the expense of the vast majority of the population). Third,
history provides no examples of societies in which structural
complexity of law is high and the number of groups is high, but
the distribution of population across groups is even and the
level of inequality is low. Therefore, the structural complexity of
law and its institutions is a defining characteristic of societies
and an index - we believe also an agent - of structural com-
plexity throughout society. In this Part, we explain why this is
the case.
A. The Problem-Solving Side of the Cycle of Law
The proposition that law should be used as a problem-solving
tool for society runs long and deep in American legal theory
and legal institutions.so For example, the evolution of Ameri-
can environmental law from a nuisance-based common law sys-
tem to a highly developed federal statutory structure' was an
exercise in problem solving. Society invested heavily in complex
legal structures in order to address large problems associated
with pollution and other sources of environmental degradation,
problems that nuisance law was not adequately addressing. The
proliferation of federal environmental laws in the 1970s seems
like a "revolution" in law. However, in retrospect, the underlying
1" One of the earliest proponents of using law to fulfill social ends was Roscoe Pound.
As early as the 1920s, he portrayed law "as a social institution to satisfy social wants" and
proposed that it should be used to carry out "a continually more efficacious social
engineering." ROSCOE POUND, INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 47 (2d ed.
1954). Pound and other champions of the so-called Legal Realists were influential in
advancing social regulation as a principle objective of legal theory and institutions. See NEIL
DUXBURy, PATTERNS OF AMEICAN JURISPRUDENCE 149-59 (1995) (explaining role of legal
realism in New Deal legislation).
' See supra text accompanying notes 58-60 (explaining evolution from nuisance law to
environmental law and continued reform of command-and-control approach).
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investment in the increasingly complex legal structure which
caused the revolution had a long, gradual history. 3 '
The statutory revolution of the 1970s did not appear out of
nowhere. At the same time further investment in nuisance law
was beginning to experience decreasing returns in terms of
problem solving benefits, society was beginning to experiment
with statutory approaches, albeit cautiously, mainly at the state
and local level. 3 In the 1960s, Congress entered the field. Its
" For example, long before 1970, nuisance law had been evolving in order to address
increasingly troublesome environmental problems. The use of public nuisance causes of
action allowed consolidation of widespread injuries normally adjudicated through multiple
private nuisance actions into one lawsuit and improved the chances of obtaining an
injunction against the offensive activity. Robert V. Percival provided a classic example of
this increase in legal structure, as illustrated by two cases. See ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL.,
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION: LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 77-80, 97-99 (1992) [hereinafter
PERCIVAL, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION]. In Madison v. Duwktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co.,
83 S.W. 658 (Tenn. 1904), several farmers brought suit to enjoin a smelter from damaging
their timber and crops. Although the court found the smelter unquestionably had caused a
nuisance with respect to the plaintiffs, it declined to enjoin the pollution to any degree. See
id at 667. Three years later, in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907), the
State of Georgia brought an action in public nuisance against the same smelter on behalf
of its citizens. The Supreme Court issued an injunction restricting the level of pollution
discharge. See id. at 239.
Similarly, the development of strict liability principles relieved some of the proof of
fault problems posed to the nuisance plaintiff. The genesis of this evolutionary event is
traced to the decision to apply strict liability to "nonnatural uses" of land in Rylands v.
F/etcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868) (Eng.) (holding company constructing reservoir strictly
liable in tort for allowing water to enter and flood plaintiff's mine). This decision has since
evolved in the United States to form the principle that any "abnormally dangerous" activity
is subject to strict tort liability. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519-20 (1977)
(discussing abnormally dangerous standard). The problem of transboundary pollution
between states, which could complicate the rights of injured parties in the downwind or
downstream receiving state, was combated through the development of federal common
law remedies. See Robert Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contemporary
Models, 54 MD. L REV. 1141, 1152-55 (1995) [hereinafter Percival, EnvironmentalFederalism]
(tracing protection of state interests using federal common law). Through such judicial
refinements, nuisance law became an increasingly complicated and potent weapon of
environmental protection. See RODGERS, supra note 38, § 2.1, at 112 (contending that
nuisance theory and case law compose common law backbone of modern environmental
law). Of course, the common law itself emerged as the result of a gradual increase in legal
structure that took place during the eleventh century in England as the centralization of
power in the royal courts allowed them to dominate the local, customary-law courts. See
JOHN HUDSON, THE FORMATION OF THE ENGLISH COMMON LAW 19-23 (1996) (discussing
social, legal, and political developments that shaped common law); Harry W. Jones, Our
Uncommon Common Law, 42 TENN. L. REV. 443, 450 (1975) (stating that movement towards
centralized court system afforded greater jurisdiction).
" State and local governments restricted their legislative efforts principally to smoke
ordinances and other local impact regulatory programs. See Percival, Environmental
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efforts centered on studying issues and coordinating states' plan-
ning efforts. While those efforts would be considered timid to-
day, at the time they were novel ideas."M The initial returns in
terms of increased understanding of the problems and of ways
to approach them were tremendous, and fed directly into the
emergence of the "tougher" statutory responses taken in the
1970s.1s' During the glide pattern of the 1980s, aggregate re-
turns on this investment in legal complexity were substantial.1"
The statutes of the 1970s thus were an example of emer-
gence, chaos, sensitivity, and, some might say, catastrophe effects
surfacing in the environmental law system. The history of Ameri-
can environmental law truly meets Tainter's standard of "a seem-
ingly inexorable trend towards higher levels of complexity." 13 7
It is in every sense the manifestation of the unpredictable sur-
prise behavior a dynamical system can exhibit as a variable of
the system moves smoothly, slowly, and gradually along a contin-
uum of change.
In the 1990s, however, we find environmental law again
bumping headfirst into decreasing returns. The command-and-
control approaches taken in the 1970s and 1980s have fallen
short of the goal of eliminating environmental degradation.
These approaches are proving ineffective at tackling many of the
Federalism, supra note 132, at 1148-49 (noting that smoke abatement ordinances were
among first regulations imposed by local governments); see, e.g., Huron Portland Cement
Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 448 (1960) (holding that application of local smoke
ordinance to federally licensed river barges did not unconstitutionally interfere with
interstate commerce).
" Except for a few narrowly targeted pollution control programs, federal legislative
activity prior to 1960 relied principally on establishing planning and coordination programs
in the states, in the hope that the states would pick up and run with the ball. See Percival,
Environmental Federalism, supra note 132, at 1149-52, 1155-59 (discussing limited increase in
federal assistance to local governments in their environmental protection efforts after
World War II).
135 See supra note 59 and accompanying text (discussing emergence of command-and-
control statutory frameworks during 1970s).
" One of the unquestionable success stories of command-and-control regulation is the
reduction by 96% of airborne lead from transportation sources since 1984, principally
through direct federal regulation of lead additives in gasoline. See COUNCIL ON ENVI-
RONMENTAL QUALITY, ENVIRONMENTAL QUALnrY: TWENTY-FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT 8 (1993).
In addition, from 1983 to 1992, vehicle emissions of carbon monoxide dropped 37% even
though vehicle miles traveled increased 34%. See id. at 6.
137 TAINTER, supra note 4, at 3.
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remaining major pollution issues, such as mobile sources of air
pollution and nonpoint sources of water pollution."
In his thorough analysis of the current environmental regula-
tion policy's failure to solve environmental degradation prob-
lems, Professor Arnold Reitze has captured the phenomenon of
decreasing returns in environmental law. He posits that the
increasingly specialized efforts of command-and-control regulato-
ry style that has predominated since the 1970s are "limited by
the law of diminishing returns. Pollution control programs usual-
ly bring further improvement at very high marginal cost, with
continued environmental destruction occurring despite extraordi-
nary efforts at control." 9 Going further down the path of
" As Percival suggests, command-and-control style environmental regulation started
"with the easiest targets of opportunity- the most serious environmental problems that
could be most easily cured get addressed first. We are now working our way down the list
to problems that are either less serious or more intractable." PERCIVAL, ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION, supra note 132, at 8. For example, federal regulation of air and water
pollution in the 1970s and 1980s focused on so-called "end-of-the-pipe" controls on
stationary, discrete "point sources," largely because "pollution control technology
emphasized end-of-the-pipe solutions," but also because such sources were "easier to
control, both politically and administratively." See id. at 885. Today, however, the majority
of carbon monoxide and a significant portion of the volatile organic compounds and
nitrogen oxide emitted into the ambient air are from mobile sources such as automobiles,
the regulation of which poses much thornier administrative and political challenges. See id.
at 766-68 (discussing complexities of legislation designed to control emissions from mobile
sources). Similarly, nonpoint source water pollution, which includes diffuse runoff from
streets, farms, mines, and other areas, accounts for "nearly 100 percent of sediment, 82
percent of nitrogen, and 84 percent of phosphorous reaching the nation's surface waters."
See id. at 944. Estimates are that such nonpoint pollution "account[s] for 65 percent of the
contamination in polluted rivers, 76 percent in impaired lakes, and 45 percent in damaged
estuaries." Id. Controlling the diffuse and numerous sources of nonpoint source water
pollution has proven difficult at both the federal and state levels. See id. at 945-48
(discussing extension of jurisdiction of Clean Water Act to wetlands); U.S. ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY, NATIONAL WATER QUALnIY INVENTORY: 1994 REPORT TO CONGRESS
403 (1995) (explaining that diffuse sources are more difficult to control than traditional
point sources); John G. Mitchell, Our Polluted Runoff. Wuiespread as Rain and Deadly as
Poison, NAT'L GEOGRAPHIC, Feb. 1996, at 106 passim (discussing pervasiveness and lack of
regulation of nonpoint source pollution).
,"9 Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Environmental Policy - It Is Time for a New Beginning, 14
COLUM. J. ENvrL. L. 111, 116-17 (1989); see also Daniel J. Fiorino, Toward a New System of
Environmental Regulation: The Case for an Industry Sector Approach, 26 ENvrL. L. 457, 459 n.ll
(1996) (maintaining that "economists agree that the costs of reducing each unit of
pollution nearly always increase as more stringent controls are required"). Possibly in an
effort to defend the economic rationality of its programs, the Environmental Protection
Agency recently has released reports purporting to show that pollution control laws yield
substantially more economic benefits than costs. See, e.g., Draft Report Concludes Air Act
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more coercive, narrowly-targeted regulation in response to newly-
perceived environmental problems is costing society more and
getting it less.
Therefore, the story of environmental law is the story of soci-
ety increasing legal structure to solve problems, but facing di-
minishing returns along the way. The legal structure's dominant
form may change."4 But the underlying theme, operating grad-
ually and below the surface of what may appear to be punctuat-
ed bursts of legal development, explains the history of these
changes. That theme is increasing investment in legal structure.
And while investment in legal structure as a strategy unquestion-
ably has solved many problems of environmental degradation, it
also has spawned large new regulatory bureaucracies, breathtak-
ingly complicated regulatory schemes, masses of specialized legal
and engineering consultants, new curriculums in law and engi-
neering schools, new technologies and methodologies, and so
on.
Thus, problem solving through increasing structural complexi-
ty in the style of modern environmental law requires additional
investment in the infrastructure of the modern administrative
state. Environmental law is but one example of the approach
that becomes the default position of the modern administrative
state generally. This reality leads to the question of whether the
Benefits $6 Trillion Greater then Associated Casts, 27 Env't Rep. (BNA) 373 (1996); Economic
Benefits from Clean Water Amount to Billions Annually, EPA Says, 27 Env't Rep. (BNA) 391
(1996). While these claims of aggregate benefits versus costs may be true, they do not
address the point we raise, which focuses on the marginal benefit of new law. In that
regard, evidence is that new environmental regulations often have a net negative effect. See,
e.g., David Bennett, Zero Emission Vehicles: The Air Pollution Messiah? Northeastern States
Mandate ZEVs Without Considering the Alternatives or Consequences, 20 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. &
POL'Y REV. 333, 362 (1996) (explaining that electricity for car batteries often comes from
fossil fuel power plants); Environmental Hanm May Outweigh Benefits of Mandated Electric Car
Sales, Report Says, 27 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1035 (1996) (explaining that air pollution benefits
of electric cars may be offset by lead discharge effects of vehicles' use of lead-acid batter-
ies). Hence, the fact that regulation may produce more good than harm in the aggregate
does not alone justify continued addition to the pot of regulation.
40 For example, the transition from nuisance to statutes, which gives rise to efforts to
describe the "phases" of the evolution of environmental law. See, e.g., PERciVAL,
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, supra note 132, at 103-12 (recounting chronology of federal
environmental legislation); E. Donald Elliott et al., Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The
Federalization of Environmental Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313, 315-25 (1985) (characterizing
evolution of environmental law as series of six stages, each associated with distinctive
pattern of organization and incentives).
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problem-solving feature of law in the modem administrative
state could lead to its own set of problems.
B. The Problem-Creating Side of the Cycle of Law
In the history of the modern administrative state, we find the
problem of decreasing returns from law popping up again and
again. The strategy of shifting to new forms of legal structure
(e.g., nuisance to command-and-control to something new) to
enhance the effectiveness of legal complexity can only work so
long before decreasing returns take over again. As each new
shift involves a quantum boost in the complexity of legal struc-
ture, decreasing returns come faster and harder.
We believe this general theme of increasing investment in
legal structure leading to decreasing returns and increasing
vulnerability plays out through a five-step cycle of social change.
This cycle is predicted by Tainter's work in archaeology, by
Tenner's examination of technology, and by complexity theory
in general. For the first step in the cycle, pick up the story at
any point at which structural complexity has been added to the
sociolegal system, such as with the statutory revolution in envi-
ronmental law of the 1970s described above. The immediate
consequence of that addition (Step 2) is to create a new set of
"winners" and "losers" with respect to the new law's economic
and social impacts.'
As those new categories of winners and losers are added to
the preexisting arrays of winners and losers, the level of social
heterogeneity caused by legal complexity increases (Step 3). This
increase is the result of each person's unique accumulation of
winner and loser outcomes under the increasingly complicated,
"I' See, e.g., PERCIVAL, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, supra note 132, at 188 (asserting
that "[i]n the 1990s, it is undeniably obvious in a way that it was not in 1970 that
environmental policy produces winners and losers and, generally, that it has significant
costs"). For example, in the environmental law realm, "the costs of pollution control are
not distributed evenly among governmental entities, individuals, and businesses." Id.
Indeed, the costs are not distributed evenly within any of those broad sectors. For example,
Yeager's comprehensive study of the EPA's pollution control regulatory regime concluded
that coercive regulations imposing technology and other capital compliance investments
"tend to be regressive, disproportionately burdening the smaller companies with expensive
implementation duties." See YEAGER, supra note 55, at 292. Enforcement of the rules
"reproduces economic inequality... [and] the conditions creating structural bias in law."
hM
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intertwined set of laws. Thus, each person moves closer and
closer to becoming a separate group, increasing the probability
that the person will voluntarily exit or involuntarily be excluded
from membership in other groups. 42  The immense
proliferation of environmental interest groups in the past two
decades provides evidence of this in the environmental policy
world.4" Interest groups increasingly define their respective
missions based on increasingly small differences of position with
other groups about increasingly narrow issues of policy.'
"4 At the broader sociological level, this phenomenon has become sadly evident in the
emergence of America's "bowling alone" culture - more people are bowling than ever,
but bowling league membership is down significantly. Mounting evidence suggests that the
so-called "cultural social capital" of a society - the ability of people to work together for
common purposes in groups and organizations - is depleted with the decline in cross-
group membership in nonfamily based social groups such as civic and hobby clubs,
churches, sports leagues, and other volunteer organizations. See FRANCIS FUKAYAMA, TRUST:
THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF PROSPERrTY (1995) (discussing implications of
America's decline of sociability in relation to economic life); James S. Coleman, Social
Capital and the Creation of Human Capita4 94 AM. J. SOCIOLOGY 95 (1988) (characterizing
social acts of individual as being governed by social norms, rules, and obligations as well as
independent and self-interested motivations); Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: Americds
Declining Social Capita, 6J. DEMOCRACY 65 (1995) (discussing phenomena of declining civic
engagements in American communities); John J. Fialka, The Folks at Lodge 88 Are Tiying to
Build a Better Moose Trap, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 1996, at Al (describing changes fraternal
organizations, like Moose Lodges, undergo as they seek to replenish older and declining
memberships by offering more family-oriented activities to attract increased family
participation); Jill Lawrence, Wante& Good Citizens, Close Communities, USA TODAY, Dec. 16,
1996, at IA (suggesting decline in church, school, volunteer, and other community-based
groups may have led to "incivility" in society). Legal order, because it purportedly does the
work of conflict resolution and capital building for us, has the propensity to displace social
capital. However, "[w]hile governments can enact policies that have the effect of depleting
social capital, they have great difficulties understanding how to build it up again."
FUKAYAMA, supra, at 11.
' This is true on both "sides" of the environmental politics spectrum. For example,
the so-called "wise use movement" is a loosely organized coalition of dispersed property
rights and anti-regulation advocacy groups that is by far more "grass roots" than its
environmentalist foes. The umbrella League of Private Property Voters lists over four
hundred participating groups as diverse as the Alaska Loggers Association, New Mexico
Cattle Growers Association, and the Wyoming Wool Growers. See LEAGUE OF PRIVATE
PROPERTY VOTERS, 1995-96 PRIVATE PROPERTY CONGRESSONAL VOTE INDEX 19-22 (1996).
On the other side, the National Wildlife Federation now lists over 600 environmental
protection advocacy groups in its annual directory. See NATIONAL WILDLIFE FEDERATION,
CONSERVATION DIRCrORY (1996).
'" As groups splinter and proliferate, stronger polarization is inevitable, as has been
the experience in recent years with respect to environmental policy. See Group's
Environmental Score Card Shows Most Congresional Polarization in 25 Years, 26 Env't Rep.
(BNA) 2028 (1996) (reporting wide divergence of views on environmental issues).
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Selection in the market place may be good to a point, but it
is a harbinger of increasing inequality across society. As the
number of laws and associated winner-loser outcomes increase,
over any normal distribution, some people will wind up being
losers far more. often than winners, and vice versa. As the num-
ber of laws increases, the potential spectrum of disparity widens
(Step 4)." In environmental law, for example, even if the
total cost to society imposed by regulation is exceeded by the
benefits derived therefrom, that would not ameliorate the un-
even distribution of costs and benefits across the population.'
16
Indeed, the premise of the environmental justice movement is
that certain subpopulations - usually minority and low income
groups - have borne most of the costs and received none of
the benefits of environmental regulation.47 These inequalities
. For example, Professor Robert Frank has studied the emergence of America's
"winner-take-all" culture, in which more and more citizens compete for ever fewer and
bigger prizes, thus encouraging economic waste, income inequality, and an impoverished
cultural life. See ROBERT H. FRANK & PHILIPJ. COOK, THE WINNER-TAKE-ALL SOCIETY (1995)
(arguing that unequal distribution of opportunities has accounted for huge income
disparities and resulting social problems); ROBERT H. FRANK, CHOOSING THE RIGHT POND
(1987) (explaining that people's concern about their economic status affects their behavior
in systematic ways). To the extent that legal structure creates or enforces social winner-loser
outcomes, law serves to strengthen these effects. American culture has made the mistake of
acting as if increasing aggregate national economic growth - growth often facilitated by
increasing legal structure - necessarily translates into greater socioeconomic equality and
justice. But "[t]he concept of inequality deals with relative difference.... Inequality refers
to the shape of the pyramid, not the absolute level of the pyramid." MURRAY MILNER, JR.,
THE ILLUSION OF EQUALIY 36 (1974) (documenting increased investment in social
structure designed to foster equality of educational opportunity, which has not led to
increased economic equality). Thus, while household income is on the rise and the
number of people in poverty is falling in the United States, income stratification in the
United States is widening at an alarming rate. See David J. Lynch, Widening Income Gap
Divides USA, USA TODAY, Sept. 23, 1996, at IB; Haya El Nasser, Income Up for 1st Time Since
1989, USA TODAY, Sept. 27, 1996, at 1A. A larger pie of wealth is being divided in an
increasingly uneven manner.
" As Percival puts it, "to understand the development and implementation of
environmental policy, it is necessary to consider not only how efficient policies are, but also
how equitable." PERCIVAL, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, supra note 132, at 188. But doing
so requires consideration of the pre-existing order of winners and losers and the likely
modification of that order caused by the new rule, a task that quickly becomes dauntingly
complicated as the winners and losers become increasingly stratified both vertically
(inequality) and horizontally (heterogeneity). See MASTERS, supra note 4, at 205 (explaining
that the "definition of... new rules is of ever-increasing complexity because the new
norms must consider both the novel behaviors that manipulate the existing system for
private benefit and the original goals of the law").
.47 One of the founders and leading advocates of the environmental justice movement
HeinOnline  -- 30 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 463 1996-1997
University of California, Davis [Vol. 30:405
created by environmental law will increase further as the struc-
tural complexity of environmental law increases.
Increasing inequality is, of course, generally inconsistent with
broad sociolegal goals. Whatever reasons there may be for in-
creasing structural complexity in environmental law to solve
environmental problems, if the result creates other social prob-
lems and increases social inequality, what have we achieved? In
describes its central thesis as being that "[c]ommunities consisting primarily of people of
color continue to bear a disproportionate burden of this nation's air, water, and waste
problems" and that such "[e]nvironmental racism exists within local zoning boards as well
as the Environmental Protection Agency." Robert D. Bullard, The Threat of Environmental
Racism, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Winter 1993, at 23, 23. Several studies suggest that local
authority zoning practices often result in exclusion along race and income lines. See Note,
State-Sponsored Growth Control Management as a Remedy for Exclusionary Zoning, 108 HARV. L
REV. 1127, 1129-39 (1995) (discussing local exclusionary zoning practices in various states
and judicial or state legislative responses). The contention that environmental protection
regulation has led to racial and income inequality has been challenged, however, as paying
too little attention to effects other than alleged discrimination. See Vicki Been, Locally
Undesirable Land Uses in Minority Neighborhoods: Disproportionate Siting or Market Dynamics, 103
YALE LJ. 1383, 1385 (1994) (criticizing studies that examine only current racial make-up in
affected communities, but fail to observe racial make-up at time sites were chosen). The
topic of environmental justice, and whether injustice truly exists, has exploded in the last
decade in legal and social commentary. See, e.g., DAVID E. NEwTON, ENVIRONMENTAL
JUSTICE (1996); Symposium, Race, Class, and EnvironmentalJustice, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 839
(1992) (observing that environmental practices lead to structure of racial subordination
and domination that has characterized American policy-making); Symposium, Urban
EnvironmentalJustice, 21 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 431 (1994) (analyzing administrative solutions
to inequitable destruction of environmental hazards). Several legal academic texts also
examine this topic. See, e.g., KENNETH A. MANASTER, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND
JUSTICE (1995) (discussing alleged failure of environmental enforcement and cleanup pro-
grams to respond to needs of poor and minority communities). Furthermore, various
governmental programs were designed to identify and address instances of environmental
injustice. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,898, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (1994) (directing executive
agencies to develop strategy for identifying and addressing instances of environmental
injustice); 40 C.F.R. § 7.35 (providing EPA rules to implement Tide VI of Civil Rights Act
of 1964 in connection with environmental justice claims); UNITED STATES ENVTL.
PROTECTION AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTnCE STRATEGY: EXECUTIVE ORDER 12,898,
EPA/200-R-95-002 (1995) (reporting on implementation of Executive Order 12,898 by EPA
Office of Environmental Justice); Environmental Justice in EPA's NEPA Compliance
Analysis, 61 Fed. Reg. 36,727 (1996) (providing EPA draft guidance on integration of
environmental justice analysis into environmental impact analysis documents). For a
thorough bibliography of commentary on the environmental justice issue, see Adam D.
Schwartz, The Law of Environmental Justice: A Research Pathfinder, 25 ENVrL L REP. 10,543
(1995), which argues that poor and minority populations in the United States bear a
disproportionate share of the burdens of pollution. Information on environmental justice
issues change rapidly and updates are available at EPA's web page on the topic,
Environmental Justice Home Page (last visited November 8, 1996)
<http://www.epa.gov/swerosps/ej/>.
HeinOnline  -- 30 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 464 1996-1997
1997] The Arrow of the Law
short, society has created another problem to solve according to
the prevailing social agenda.
The experience has been that society's response to those new
maladaptations, as Tainter and Tenner would predict, is to in-
tensify legal complexity (Step 5). For example, the response to
the "brownfields" problem," which the environmental justice
movement has pointed to as a visible example of the inequality
of impact, has been a heavy dose of administrative programs
and legislative solutions which inevitably will add to structural
complexity. 49  That response may solve the brownfields
See supra note 38 (describing federal environmental reforms).
'4' The Environmental Protection Agency recently issued a "Brownfields Initiative" to
combat the problem by cleaning contaminated properties and revitalizing communities
containing such sites. See 60 Fed. Reg. 9684 (1995) (announcing EPA's Brownfields
Initiative). It has identified pilot projects for examining how to address the issue. See 11
New "Brownfield" Pilot Projects Announced, 26 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1884 (1996). The EPA has
also shown how effective redevelopment grants could be. See Superfund: Brownfields Grants
fm $90,000 to $200,000 Awarded to 16 Blighted Urban Industrial Areas, 27 Env't Rep. (BNA)
1241 (1996); see generally General Poliy: President Calls for "Broumfield" Incentives, Stronger Laws
on Communities' Right to Know, 26 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1796 (1996) (discussing President
Clinton's dual goals of cleaning up brownfields and limiting liability for polluters); Richard
A. Horsch et al., Brownfield Redevelopment, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Summer 1996, at 55
(discussing problem with brownfields and Environmental Protection Agency's efforts to
encourage redevelopment). Congress has sought to address the issue through measures de-
signed to ameliorate the risks faced by redevelopment projects under CERCLA. See, e.g.,
H.R. 2178, 104th Cong. (1995) (introducing legislation to clean up brownfields and reduce
liability for investors and bankers); see generally Superfund: Amendment to Pending House
Superfund Bill Would Set Grants, Loans for "Brownfields," 26 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1882 (1996)
(discussing amendment which would provide more fiscal certainty for investors involved in
cleanup). Information on brownfields issues changes rapidly and updates are available at
EPA's web page on the topic, Brownfields Home Page (visited November 8, 1996)
<http://www.epa.gov/swerosps/bf/>. Many states have also established regulatory programs
to deal with the issue. See Mark D. Anderson, The State Voluntary Cleanup Program Alternative,
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Winter 1996, at 22, 22-24 (discussing various states' voluntary
cleanup programs); Anne Slaughter Andrew, Brownfield Redevelopment: A State-Led Reform of
Superfund Liability, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Winter 1996, at 27, 27-30 (explaining
brownfields problem and midwestern states' responses); Elizabeth Glass Geltman, Recycling
Land& Encouraging the Redevelopment of Contaminated Property, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T,
Spring 1996, at 3 (detailing different states' approaches to brownfields and voluntary
cleanup laws); Hazardous Waste: Mayors Release Proposal on Brownfields; President Urges Support
for Tax Incentives, 26 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1871 (1996) (discussing United States Conference
of Mayors's proposal on brownfields and President Clinton's tax incentives plan); see
generally OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, THE STATE OF THE STATES ON BROWNFIELDS:
PROGRAMS FOR CLEANUP AND REUSE OF CONTAMINATED SITES (1995) (discussing state pro-
grams addressing brownfields clean up); Michael J. Fleck, The Illinois Brownfields Law:
Environmental Protection Meets Economic Productivity, 84 ILL. B.J. 400 (1996); Karen Hansen,
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problem, but could lead to the emergence of other problems in
its place."w Thus the cycle begins anew.
To summarize, we posit that a cycle of increasing structural
complexity in the sociolegal system exists due to many of the
factors Tainter and Tenner identified when applying complexity
theory to other social settings. The cycle has five steps:
1. Society responds to a perceived problem by increasing the
complexity of legal structures - for example, a new law, a
new agency, a new precedent, or a new administrative pro-
gram.
2. The increasingly complex legal structure distributes costs
and benefits, both directly and through unforeseen mecha-
nisms, unevenly throughout the population, thus increasing
heterogeneity.
3. With each additional increment of legal structure, each
individual moves closer to a unique set of costs and bene-
fits, thus increasing the number of groups and decreasing
the cross-membership between groups.
4. As heterogeneity increases, the spectrum of inequality
across the population widens, thus leading to other per-
ceived problems for social response.
5. Society responds to the new problems through further in-
vestment in legal structure.
Step 5 is different from Step 1 in the important respect that the
decreasing returns effect requires the intensification of invest-
ment in legal structure at Step 5.1" Hence, the phenomenon
Minnesota's Landfill Cleanup Program:" A New Superfund Paradigm, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T,
Winter 1996, at 32 (explaining Minnesota's cleanup program).
'5o For example, if the solution to brownfields redirects investment back to the affected
urban areas, what about the suburban or rural "greenfield" areas where the investment was
being directed before the solution? Will those areas become depressed? If the new
investment in urban areas spurs economic development in urban settings, will traffic, smog,
and housing scarcity become a larger urban problem? Unfortunately, no one can know.
... Howard calls this "responding by convulsions," meaning that "[g]overnment, believ-
ing it can only act through specific dictates, lurches again to solve yesterday's problems."
HowARD, supra note 10, at 47. The diminishing returns effect means that the convulsions
get worse each time. See MAsTERS, supra note 4, at 201 ("It follows that policy implementa-
tion by the bureaucracy has feedback effects on coercive law enforcement: each new strate-
gy for securing the collective good defines new alternatives for violating the laws and there-
by creates a new excuse for expanding the bureaucratic apparatus."); Harry V. Jaffa, The
Party of Lincoln vs. the Party of Bureaucrats, WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 1996, at A14 (contending
that "[olne need not be cynical to see that the poor were not the reason for the expansion
of bureaucracy, the expansion of bureaucracy was the reason for the poor. Every failure to
reduce poverty was always represented as another reason to increase expenditures on the
poor.").
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of decreasing returns - the demand it poses for increasing
investments of sociolegal complexity - drives the legal complex-
ity cycle toward the creation of the modern administrative state.
Once there, maintaining the fitness of the sociolegal system
requires ever-increasing investments in structural complexity. The
resulting structure ultimately reaches levels of interconnectedness
and intensity that pose the problem of increasing vulnerability to
collapse. We do not know when the threshold into dangerous
levels of vulnerability is crossed, but all indications are that the
arrow of law in the modern administrative state is pointed in
that direction.
III. BREAKING THE CYCLE OF COMPLEX LEGAL
STRUCTURE - TWO MAXIMS FOR SUSTAINING
LAw's PLACE IN SOCIETY
The preceding discussion leads to two questions yet unan-
swered: first, what happens when structural complexity of law
and its institutions becomes materially higher than that experi-
enced in the modern administrative state to date; and second,
can the cycle of increasing legal complexity be controlled? We
do not yet know the answer to the first question, but we suspect
sociolegal collapse will occur in any society that increases the
complexity of its legal structure significantly beyond the present
levels experienced in developed nations. So, our real concern is
the second question.
In that regard, by now an astute reader may have detected
what appears to be an incongruity in our analysis: how is it, one
might reasonably ask, that societies acting as complex adaptive
systems adapt to stress in a way that leads to collapse? Why do
societies not use the means other complex adaptive systems use
to stay poised on the edge of chaos? These are good questions,
but the problem is not with complexity theory or our model.
Rather, the problem is human behavior. Societies en route to
collapse are behaving just as complexity theory suggests complex
adaptive systems will under the circumstances, because human
behavior is suppressing the behavioral qualities that keep these
systems robust.
As complexity theory demonstrates, successful complex adap-
tive systems acting free of human influence breed as much com-
1997] 467
HeinOnline  -- 30 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 467 1996-1997
University of California, Davis [Vol. 30:405
plexity of structure as they need to stay poised in an adaptive
state. How do they manage to do that? Complexity theory re-
searchers believe they have found the answer in what is known
in their literature as self-critical behavior. Simply put, self-critical
behavior is a means of relieving system stress by integrating
small "avalanches" into the regular system behavior rather than
waiting for the big crash to do the job - the way an area of
tectonic activity might produce thousands of small tremors in
order to avoid a severe earthquake. 52 Systems thus regulate
structural complexity by avoiding it in the first place or shed-
ding it in small doses when needed to avoid buildup of unman-
ageable stress levels.
152 Self-organized criticality is "[a] generic pattern of self-organized nonequilibrium
behavior in which there are characteristic long-range temporal and spatial regularities."
COVENEY & HIGHFIELD, supra note 2, at 432. An example is provided by physicist Per Bak,
who is credited as being the founder of the principle:
Bak asks us to consider a tabletop onto which sand is dropped at a uniform
rate. As the sand piles up, it begins to slide off the edges of the table. Eventual-
ly, the system reaches a steady state at which the mean rate of dropping sand
onto the pile equals the mean rate at which sand falls over the edges. At this
stage, the slopes from the peak to the edges of the table are near the rest an-
gle for sand. Bak asks the following question: If one adds a single grain of sand
to the pile at a random location and thereby starts an avalanche, what will the
distribution of avalanche sizes be? He finds a characteristic power-law distribu-
tion relating the frequencies and sizes of avalanches, with many tiny avalanches
and few large ones.
KAUFFmAN, supra note 2, at 255; see generaly, Fred Guterl, Riddles in the Sand, DiSCOVER, Nov.
1996, at 104 (describing current research on Bak's theory and into unexplained behavior
of sand and beads generally); I. Peterson, Shaken Bead Beds Show Pimples and Dimples, 150
SCI. NEWS 135 (1996) (reporting on formation of strange "puddles" during vibrating beads
experiments); Science with Brass, Sci. AM., Nov. 1996, at 28 (noting curious patterns formed
from vibrating oscillons). Bak has demonstrated how the principle might apply to earth-
quakes, clouds, solar flares, biological evolution, and economies. He posits that it is a nec-
essary feature for integration of any system component into a highly complex system. See
Per Bak, How NATuRE WORKS: THE SCIENCE OF SELF-ORGANiZED CRITICALrIY (1996); Per
Bak, SelfOrganized Criticality: A Holistic View of Nature, in COMPLEXITY: METAPHORS, MODELS,
AND REAiry, supra note 2, at 477-93 (discussing theoretical work on models displaying self-
organized criticality); B. Kean Sawhill, Self-Organized Criticality and Complexity Theory, in 1993
LECTURES IN COMPLEX SYMMS, supra note 46, at 143-47 (discussing pattern formation in
nature). We have elaborated elsewhere on our belief that an externally-, or, in the case of
human organizations, self-imposed structural error could prevent this adaptive behavior
from occurring, thus allowing other forces to move the system out of the complex behavior
region. See Ruhl, Brief Discussions, supra note 3 (explaining complexity theory's applications
to society).
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Humans pose two obstacles to self-critical behavior in the
sociolegal system. First, because it is the easiest way of under-
standing much (but not all) of what happens around them,
humans are incessantly reductionist in approaching problems of
society. Thus, their behavior obscures the underlying dynamical
qualities of social mechanics in the first place.' Second, hu-
mans resist incorporating self-critical behavior as a means of
regulating structural complexity because self-critical behavior in a
social context requires voluntary sacrifice and restraint, neither
of which has proven to be a successful political platform in the
administrative state."l These effects work against the complex
adaptive nature of society as a system. Only deliberate steps to
intervene on behalf of adaptiveness will cut short the cycle to-
wards collapse. 5
In this final section we offer two maxims designed to begin
that intervention. With all the criticism we have leveled thus far
at legal complexity, a reader might anticipate that we are about
1' See Ruhl, Complexity Theo as a Paradigm, supra note 3, at 893-95 (discussing general
fallacies in reductionist thinking).
"s' This is patently obvious in the environmental protection realm, where self-critical
behavior might begin with the exercise of restraint in environmental degradation, which, as
a consequence, may ease the compulsion politically to impose additional sociolegal struc-
ture to address the problem. Unfortunately, "[iun their roles as consumers and producers,
members of the social classes most favoring increased environmental protection have life-
styles intimately associated with massive waste-generating activities including, for example,
the serious environmental problems associated with solid waste, automobiles, and the ad-
vances of technology." YEAGER, supra note 55, at 307; see also Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Federal-
ism and the Inspection and Maintenance Program Under the Clean Air Act, 27 PAC. LJ. 1461
(1996) (explaining that "Americans are not eager to sacrifice to protect the environment.
They want both a clean, safe environment and the freedom to behave in a manner that
makes protecting such an environment very difficult.").
5 Of course, the collapse of societies may itself be a form of self-critical behavior. The
collapse sustains adaptability of the human species as a whole over time by preventing one
dominant society from ruling the world or large parts of it for very long. That possibility,
however, is not very comforting for the members of the collapsing society to make the self-
critical effect for the larger system possible. Our approach is to embed self-critical behavior
at the single-society system level, perhaps making the need for collapse of individual societ-
ies obsolete. For example, a purposefully cyclic economy built and fluctuating around an
adaptively mean size may mitigate economic and environmental problems associated with
the increasing population and resource consumption levels, of "growth" economies while
maintaing the change necessary to foster new enterprises. Of course, this requires voluntary
sacrifice, self-restraint, and self-critical behavior, which Americans have not often exhibited
in the environmental protection realm. See supra note 154 (pointing out that consumers
want to protect their environment yet maintain lifestyles that create waste and environmen-
tal problems).
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to propose that society "trash" law and legal structure. That is
not the case. We do not want to give the impression that law is
"evil" or always a drain on society; rather, as we have stated, law
has powerful problem-solving dimensions that are essential to
any successful society. Hence, we propose that society take steps
to enhance the problem-solving side of law and suppress the
problem-creating side.
A. Make Less Law - A Self-Imposed Self-Criticality
The root cause of the increasing structural complexity of law
is additions to the "mass" of laws. As this mass grows, the inter-
dependence between laws and society grows. Compliance with
laws becomes more complicated, and regulatory and enforce-
ment infrastructures become increasingly necessary. Centraliza-
tion of the entire law-making machinery becomes a more effi-
cient (but in the end disastrous) means of governing. Quantita-
tively, therefore, an index of the structural complexity of law
might measure such factors as the number of laws, the number
of pages in the code books, the number of regulatory proscrip-
tions stated in the laws, and the cost of complying with the
laws."5 Whatever indices might be devised, their purpose must
's As Black posited:
Law is a quantitative variable. It increases and decreases, and one setting has
more than another. It is possible to measure the quantity of law in many
ways.... More generally, the quantity of law is known by the number and
scope of prohibitions, obligations, and other standards to which people are
subject, and by the rate of legislation, litigation, and adjudication. As a quanti-
tative variable, law is all of this and more.
BLAcK, supra note 129, at 3. He contends that "the more stratification a society has, the
more law it has." Id. at 13. Further, the "law increases with differentiation to a point of
interdependence but declines with symbiosis." Id. at 39. Finally, "[t]he quantity of law varies
with the organization of its environment." Id. at 86. His explanation of these relationships
is largely descriptive in focus. However, he goes beyond this explanation to suggest that the
condition of society - its levels of stratification, heterogeneity, and organization - may be
used as a sort of exogenous variable that allows us to predict the quantity of law that will
exist in a given setting. See, e.g., id. at 131 (arguing that "[i]f these [social] trends continue
into the future, law will increase all the more.... Everywhere, law increases with the evolu-
tion from tribal to modem life .... ."). His observations are, nonetheless, astute. Complexi-
ty theory allows us, we believe, to explain the relationships Black says exist. A theory of
interrelated feedback loops reveals why the quantity of law is more akin to an affirmative
agent of increasing social inequality, heterogeneity, and complexity, rather than simply a
function of those conditions.
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be to measure the structural load the legal system places on
society.
Without proposing such an index, we believe we are safe in
proposing that measures which reduce the mass of laws would
also reduce the complexity of legal structures. We do not mean
to suggest that existing laws should simply be discarded and
none put in their place - our model is not a Libertarian mani-
festo. 5-7 Rather, we propose that the structure and philosophy
of our law-making apparatus must be transformed so that the
objective of controlling legal complexity is a foremost concern.
Structurally, for example, Tainter's work in the study of
complexly structured societies suggests that a principal indication
that social structure is approaching critical levels is centralization
of government." Further, he indicates that one of the first
signs of social collapse is the forced wresting of control from
central government to smaller, outlying units of government.59
'17 Wholesale deregulation simply for the sake of reducing sociolegal structure would be
as unpredictable in result as, say, unplugging all computers so as to relieve the stresses
caused by technology structure. As our critique of path dependence theory demonstrates,
deregulation would not unwind the system back to pre-regulation days. See supra notes 15-
18 and accompanying text (explaining that once society decides to travel down one branch
of decision node, it cannot later simply retrace its steps to that node and choose another
branch). Rather, because the entire system evolves along with the buildup of sociolegal
structure, the process becomes "reversible only under great hardship." See Tainter, supra
note 80, at 3. Thus, Masters explains, "as more people become dependent on the goods
and services of the bureaucracy, individuals and groups consider past benefits to be a part
of the natural environment and defend their specific advantages against reductions justified
in the name of the collective good." MASrERs, supra note 4, at 210-11. Ironically, however,
deregulation in complexly structured societies often becomes an attractive political goal,
because
government adds complexity to people's lives, through behavioral regulation
and increases in the number and diversity of activities in which people must
engage. So strong is the [public's] aversion to hierarchically imposed complexi-
ty that politicians in our day successfully base their careers on exploiting the
discontent it creates, and journalists win prizes for exposing iL
Tainter, supra note 80, at 12. As the 104th Congress perhaps best illustrates, once politi-
cians of this ilk are ushered into office on a raw deregulation bandwagon, they soon discov-
er that the process is much more complicated, unpredictable, and painful than the politi-
cal rhetoric suggests, and so do the citizens who supported them. Hence, although deregu-
lation may at times be a part of the process of controlling the growth of sociolegal struc-
ture, it must be carried out very carefully, and without unyielding expectations of success.
s See TAINTER, supra note 4, at 123.
' See id. It is difficult to ignore the emergence in recent years of a "devolution"
sentiment in American society. See Symposium: To Devolve, or Not to Devolve?: The (D)evolution
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The same story is unfolding in the history of American federal-
ism, as the gradual dilution of the nondelegation doctrine 60
of Environmental Law, 27 PAC. L.J. 1457 (1996). Although public support for strong environ-
mental protection policies remains high, polls suggest that increasingly the public wishes
that primarily state and local governments are responsible for actual policy decision-
making. See Americans Favor State, Local Controls, Poll Says, 27 Env't Rep. (BNA) 801 (1996)
(citing poll showing 65% of participants prefer state or local control of environmental
issues to federal control); Jonathan H. Adler & Kellyanne Fitzpatrick, For the Environment,
Against Overregu/ation, WALL ST. J., July 29, 1996, at A12 (quoting statistics which reflect
67% who favor state and local responsibility for protecting water quality in rivers, lakes, and
streams, and 77% who favor state and local responsibility for maintaining water quality).
Recent opinion surveys suggest a broadening dissatisfaction with the federal government
and increasing faith in local government. See Government Gets Poor Marks, USA TODAY, Jan.
23, 1996, at 4A (citing Gallup poll of 2000 people). As this mood has emerged, entrenched
federal interests and groups basing their platform on the preservation of centralized power
have resisted even opening the debate. See, e.g., Robert Housman, The Devil Is In the
Exogenous Variables, ENvTL. F., May-June 1996, at 32, 33 (noting that market pressures to
maintain federal environmental laws are even greater now with global economy, and that
decentralized environmental regulatory scheme would lead to hodgepodge of laws that
powerful local industrial actors could easily infuse with protectionism); Vickie Patton, A
Balanced Partnership, ENvrL F., May-June 1996, at 16, 17 (criticizing arguments
championing state regulation in lieu of federal regulation because they unduly attack
cooperative federalism, which is sound foundation of current national environmental
policy). As one state environmental agency official recently complained, "EPA, despite all
its professions of a desire for flexibility, for new approaches, for a greater state authority
and autonomy, is taking the same old centralized Washington-knows-best attitude." See
EPA's Approach Toward State Audit Law Shows No fexibility, 27 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1446 (1996)
(quoting chairman of Texas environmental agency). The devolution debate is brewing in
other areas of social regulation as well. See, e.g., Peter H. Schuck, Some Reflections on the
Federalism Debate, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 1 (1996) (providing an overview of the
devolution topic); Note, Devolving Welfare Programs to the States: A Public Choice Perspective, 109
HARV. L. REV. 1984, 1994-2000 (1996) (describing debate about whether federal or state
governments should have responsibility for welfare regulations).
60 Based on the fiction of "Congress... obtaining the assistance of its coordinate
branches," delegation of legislative power from Congress to agencies has been upheld
consistently. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989). The only limitation is
that the delegation not be done with "an absence of standards for the guidance of the
[agency's] action, so that it would be impossible in a proper proceeding to ascertain
whether the will of Congress has been obeyed." Id. at 379 (quoting Yakus v. United States,
321 U.S. 414, 425-26 (1944)). The standard of what is required is also known as the
"intelligible principles" test, seeJ.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409
(1928), which insisted that Congress 'lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to
which the person or body authorized to [exercise the delegated authority] is directed to
conform." The courts have supported a finding of proper delegation based on legislative
directives as abstract and compassless as "public interest, convenience, or necessity." See,
e.g., National Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 217 (1943) (upholding delegation
of power to FCC to promulgate regulations in accordance with its view of public interest).
In addition, Justice Scalia asks, "What legislated standard, one must wonder, can possibly be
too vague to survive judicial scrutiny, when we have repeatedly upheld, in various contexts,
472
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and expansion of the federal commerce power 6 ' have
facilitated the growth of a central federal government at the
expense of state and local authority. The question is whether
society can exercise self-critical behavior by restoring the
Constitution's structural controls on unchecked centralization. If
it cannot, not a single example in the history of societies
suggests that the sociolegal system's collapse into radically
simpler, decentralized forms will be averted. The difference
between the two outcomes - decentralization through self-
imposed restraint versus through catastrophic restructuring - is
the intensity of pain and disruption society feels along the way.
We suggest the former route.
The decentralization of law-making power is only one step
towards managing the mass of laws. Along with decentralization
must come a catharsis from the reductionist approaches of law-
a 'public interest' standard?" Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 416 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
,61 Virtually the entire body of federal pollution control legislation, for example, is
based on the power of Congress to "regulate Commerce... among the several states." U.S.
CONST. art- I, § 8, cl. 3. The expanded federal commerce power has set the stage for grad-
ual but unmistakable centralization of law-making power in the federal government at the
expense of both the common law and state and local government law-making. For
example, Professor Robert Beck summarizes where the jurisprudence of the commerce
clause has led by suggesting that it could be rewritten as follows: "The Congress shall have
Power ... To regulate Commerce, articles in commerce, and anything that substantially af-
fects Commerce, and to prohibit commerce in certain articles.., among the several
States." Robert E. Beck, Setting the Course for the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of
1977, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Fall 1995, at 24, 25. He observes that "the actual wording
of the Commerce Clause has become so unimportant that most courts applying it do not
bother quoting it any more." Id, In United States v. Lopez. 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995), the Court
struck down a federal law prohibiting the possession of guns in designated school zones as
beyond the commerce power, the first such invalidation of a federal law on commerce
power grounds in over 60 years. See id. at 1634. The decision has triggered a "Lopez-watch"
in the legal community to see where it leads, but in general the Court and lower courts
have taken it nowhere. See, e.g., Cargill, Inc. v. United States, 116 S. Ct 407, 408 (1995)
(mem.) (Thomas, J., dissenting) denying cert. to Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d
1388 (9th Cir. 1995) (questioning lower court assertion of federal regulation over isolated
wetlands based on the possibility that migratory birds traveling across state boundaries
could land there to rest or feed). But see United States v. Olin Corp, 927 F. Supp. 1502,
1503 (S.D. Ala. 1996) (holding that application of Superfund to specific case was beyond
federal commerce power). See generally News ftm the Circuits, ADMIN. & REG. NEWS, Fall
1995, at 4 (collecting cases decided since Lopez refusing to strike down federal legislation
on commerce power grounds). For an extremely thorough, current description of the
original intent of that provision of authority, its history, its current doctrine, and its
possible future, see Donald H. Regan, How to Think About the Federal Commerce Power and
Incidentally Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MiCH. L REV. 554 (1995).
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making. Attention must be given to the unpredictable properties
of the sociolegal system in general. A new philosophy of law-
making is needed, one in which the mass of law is increased not
as the presumptive response to all social problems, but only
when it is determined to be absolutely necessary.
To do so, the law-making process must begin to address the
underlying sociolegal forces from which social problems emerge,
rather than simply throwing new laws at the problems that bub-
ble to the system's surface. For example, Professor Arnold Reitze
argues that the command-and-control environmental law regime
has failed to control environmental degradation because it has
completely missed the underlying sources from which environ-
mental degradation emerges - increasing population and
consumption. 6 ' So long as overall sociolegal policy remains
passive with respect those underlying forces, or even promotes
6I See Reitze, supra note 139, at 117. For a comprehensive discussion of the challenges
human population and consumption patterns pose to social policy, see JOEL E. COHEN,
How MANY PEOPLE CAN THE EARTH SUPPORT? (1995). Reitze points out elsewhere that the
administrative state's response to its continuous failure to respond to these challenges is, of
course, to promulgate yet more regulation. See Reitze, supra note 139, at 120-21 (stating
that increases in population, consumption, and as a consequence, pollution, put pressure
on environmental regulators to constantly increase stringency of pollution control
measures). This problem explodes exponentially in effect when the costs and benefits are
assessed at the global rather than national level. At recent meetings of the United Nations
Commission on Sustainable Development, for example, the Commission noted the trend
towards a global consensus on the importance of changing consumption and production
patterns and highlighted the critical linkages between population, consumption, and the
environment. See One Year Before the Review, 26 ENVTL POL'Y & L. 138 (1996). The ultimate
conclusion was that "levels of population, consumption patterns, and the nature of
technology are the three major factors which determine the effects of development on the
environment." Id at 141. A serious obstacle to approaching issues of this magnitude in any
long-term, comprehensive manner is the tendency of advanced state structures to
perpetuate and protect themselves. State lawmakers find they can best protect themselves
by using law to take "an essentially reactive stance to acute (rather than chronic) social
crises to secure a certain political legitimacy, the currency of statehood." See YEAGER, supra
note 55, at 323. This approach can work over the short run to prop up the regime, because
citizens in general tend to respond to the short run, but over the long run it leads to the
state ignoring the chronic underlying problems of its existence. As Masters indicates, " [t]he
centralized state is vulnerable over the long run precisely because it can be so successful in
generating mutual benefits and collective goods in the short-term horizon of an
individual's conscious decision making." MASTERS, supra note 4, at 185. But "[s]ooner or
later, political systems decline and collapse as it becomes impossible for them to provide
the collective goods needed to convey a sense of legitimacy and to extract resources from
the populace." Id. at 211.
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them, command-and-control environmental regulation will be
mired by increasing structural complexity.
Similarly, the law-making process must recognize that it can
be the source of social problems, and that it could solve some
social problems by reducing sociolegal complexity. For example,
defining abandoned urban industrial sites as the "brownfields"
problem 63 obscures the fact that brownfields did not exist
prior to Superfund and indeed were the direct result of
Superfund. The response has been to address brownfields as a
discrete problem requiring new laws for its solution. Had the
problem been defined as one with Superfund, however, the law-
making process may have more successfully addressed the
problem through fewer laws.
In general, therefore, those making laws must alter their focus
from reductionist, problem-specific approaches to system-level
approaches. They must also recognize that the complexity of
legal structure itself is often the cause of social problems. Both
structurally and philosophically, therefore, self-critical measures
can be taken to stem the tide of increasing legal structure be-
fore social collapse does so instead. To do this, initially, the law
must ignore some of society's problems and let them play out
and be solved, if they can be solved, through other social mech-
anisms and conventions. Law is not the only problem-solving
tool society has at its disposal. When law steps in, it risks displac-
ing other forms of resolution that society has devised over long
periods of trial and error, without any guarantee doing a better
job. Of course, society cannot know ahead of time which
63 See supra notes 149-50 and accompanying text (discussing Environmental Protection
Agency's attempt to reduce uncertainty in liability exposure at appropriate sites through
"Brownfield Initiatives").
"' It is remarkable, for example, that techniques of mediation are only recently
beginning to meaningfully influence the highly litigious world of environmental law. See
Frank P. Grad, Alternative Dispute Resolution In Environmental Law, 14 COLUM. J. ENVrL. L
157, 159-62 (1989) (summarizing applicability of mediation to environmental disputes in
light of fact that parties generally have no prior negotiating relationship and disputes tend
to be interorganizational rather than interpersonal); Charlene Stuckenborg, The Proper Role
of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) in Environmntal Conflcts, 19 U. DAYrON L. REv. 1305,
1309-28 (1994) (asserting that low acceptance of alternative dispute resolution in
environmental litigation stems from experimental nature of ADR procedures in this field).
Law did not invent mediation; rather, law practically destroyed it. It is ironic that law
portrays mediation, a social convention that has been around for quite a while, as the
"alternative" method of dispute resolution. SeeJEROLD S. AUERBACH, JUSTICE WrrHour LAW
19971
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social problems can best be resolved through nonlegal social
mechanisms and conventions. But unless society facilitates their
operation, it will never know which social problems would have
been resolved without resort to law.
Similarly, when society cannot resist the urge to step in with
law as the problem-solving tool, it should consider ways of mini-
mizing the disruption of existing social conventions or even ways
of taking advantage of them. After twenty years of command-
and-control style of environmental law, for example, we are only
now beginning to rediscover the value of laws that promote the
use of the market and the dissemination of information into
(1983) (tracing history of mediation as social convention and its gradual displacement by
legal institutions).
" See Pub. L. No. 101-549, § 401, 104 Stat. 2399, 2584 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 7651 (1994)). The Clean Air Act sulfur dioxide emissions trading program for electric
utilities is widely regarded as the most successful example of integration of market effi-
ciencies into the command-and-control regulatory structure. See, e.g., PERCIVAL,
ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, supra note 132, at 830-32 (discussing different approaches of
private and public entities); Dallas Burtraw & Byron Swift, A New Standard of Performance: An
Analysis of the Clean Air Act's Acid Rain Program, 26 ENVTL L REP. 10,411 (1996)
(concluding that program has outperformed previous command-and-control approaches);
Timothy A. Wilkins & Terrell E. Hunt, Agency Discretion and Advances in Regulatory Theory:
Flexible Agency Approaches Toward the Regulated Community as a Model for the Congess-Ageny
Relationship, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 479, 491 (1995) (explaining successful permit system
for emissions); Utilities Achieve 100 Percent Compliance with EPA Acid Rain Program, Re-port Says,
27 Env't Rep. (BNA) 885 (1996) (reporting that utilities met emissions standards under
trading program). The program is nonetheless unmistakably part of the command-and-
control regime, as the "market" for emission trading is created by regulatory fiat. See Roger
K. Raufer, Market-Based Pollution Control Regulations: Implementing Economic Theory in the Real
World, 26 ENvrL. POL'Y & L. 177, 184 (1996) (noting that "market-based systems have relied
heavily upon the [command-and-controll framework already in place"). Many
commentators have forcefully argued the need for even greater reliance on market forces
to bring about more efficient protection of environmental factors. See, e.g., Bruce A.
Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The Democratic Case for Market
Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENvrL. L. 171 (1988) (advocating market incentives over
bureaucracy); Kenneth J. Arrow et al., Is There a Role for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Environmental,
Health, and Safety Regulation, ScI., Apr. 12, 1996, at 221 (discussing cost-benefit analysis as
method to guide decision-makers); Daniel J. Dudek et al., Environmental Policy for Eastern
Europe: Technology-Based Versus Market-Based Approaches, 17 COLUM. J. ENvrL L. 1, 8-11
(1992) (arguing for market-based approach in environmental regulation); Robert W. Hahn
& Gordon L. Hester, Marketable Permits: L.ssons for Theory and Practice, 16 ECOLOGY L.Q. 361
(1989) (analyzing marketable permit program); Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins,
Incentive-Based Environmental Regulation: A New Era from an Old Idea?, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1
(1991) (discussing new market-based approaches and their likely future success); Richard
B. Stewart, Reconstitutive Law, 46 MD. L. REV. 86 (1986) (urging federal government to
reconstitute existing subsystems to achieve health, safety, and welfare goals). The
Environmental Protection Agency is no stranger to that trend and has several programs for
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the market"6 to accomplish its goal. If law does no more than
enhance the problem-solving capacity of another social institu-
tion in such a manner, it has added very little to society's struc-
tural load. Hence, whether by simply staying out of the fray, or
by propping up some other social convention, the use of self-
critical approaches in the sociolegal system opens up much
untested territory.
16 7
expanded emissions trading under consideration. See Emissions Trading Guidance for States to
Be Released this Fall EPA Official Says, 27 Env't Rep. (BNA) 525 (1996) (discussing guidance
for states to develop air emission trading' programs); Effluent Trading Options Described in
'Framework' Document Released by EPA, 27 Env't Rep. (BNA) 415 (1996) (explaining guidance
for trading pollution reduction credits within watersheds).
"6 For an example of the potential effectiveness of an information-based approach to
environmental regulation, companies subject to the toxic release reporting provisions of
the Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11023, reported
the total release of 10.4 billion pounds of specified toxic chemicals into the environment in
1987 - including 3.9 billion pounds in landfills, 3.3 billion pounds in other treatment and
disposal facilities, 2.7 billion pounds into the ambient air, and 550 million pounds in
surface waters. See PERCIVAL, ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, supra note 132, at 464. For
1993, the total reported release had fallen to 2.8 billion pounds - including 1.7 billion
pounds to the air, 289 million pounds disposed on land, and 271 million pounds into
surface waters. See id. at 465; see also Toxic Chemical Releases Decrease by 8.6 Percent in 1994,
Report Says, 27 Env't Rep. (BNA) 531 (1996); Toxic Chemical Releases Cut by 400 Million
Pounds, Chemical Manufacturers Association Reports, 27 Env't Rep. (BNA) 501 (1996). Industry
sources attribute the reporting requirement as having galvanized industry into voluntary
pollution reduction goals that in many cases exceed anything required by law. See CMA
Initiative Cuts Toxic Emissions 49 Percent Over Six Years, Official Says, 27 Env't Rep. (BNA) 11
(1996) (attributing decrease in toxic emissions and transportation accidents to industry's
Responsible Care initiative, not federal reporting requirements). Recent economic analysis
of the reporting program suggests that it creates powerful market incentives to alter firm
behavior with no direct regulation other than the reporting requirement. See Shameek
Konar & Mark A. Cohen, Information as Regulation: The Effect of Community Right to Know
Laws on Toxic Emissions, 32J. ENvrL. ECON. & MGMT. 109 (1997).
"' On the rare occasion when a bipartisan, objective analysis of issues has been
accomplished in the decision-making forum, the instinctive response appears to be one
which is entirely consistent with the operation of self-critical behavior. For example, the
President's Council on Sustainable Development, a bipartisan, diverse group charged with
recommending a national action strategy for sustainable development, has recently issued
its report recommending "reforming the current system of environmental management
and building a new and efficient framework based on performance, flexibility linked to
accountability, extended product responsibility, tax and subsidy reform, and market incen-
tives." See THE PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, SUSTAINABLE AMERICA:
A NEW CONSENSUS 25 (1996). Tainter's thesis suggests that the entrenched centralized
power structure will resist any such effort to be "rebuilt." Indeed, the word the
Environmental Protection Agency prefers is "reinvent," as in from the inside, and it has
launched several efforts, with names such as "Project XI," the "Common Sense Initiative,"
"Enterprise for the Environment," and the "Environmental Leadership Program," to
project an image of greater flexibility in its command-and-control programs without
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B. Pay Attention to Winners and
Losers - Avoiding the Inequality Trap
We will be the first to admit that no matter how strictly soci-
ety follqws our first maxim of law making, mistakes will happen.
Complexity theory tells us this is inevitable even in an adaptive,
robust society, because chaos, sensitivity, emergence, and catas-
trophe are inherent and necessary features of such complex
adaptive systems. Most complex adaptive systems, of course, do
not attach normative values to those mistakes. The weather, for
example, does not dread hurricanes and crave sunny days. Mem-
bers of society, by contrast, do attach normative values to the
unpredicted results of sociolegal activity. The problem that com-
plexity theory reveals, however, is that society cannot weed out
the normatively bad surprises ahead of time and reserve only
the good - after all, they are all surprises.
Notwithstanding this limitation on improvements in law mak-
ing, Tainter's work in the history of complexly structured societ-
ies suggests that one social effect flows generally and forcefully
from increasing social structure complexity - inequality. We
posit that as social complexity leads to increasing inequality,
society turns to further increases in complex legal structures to
reduce inequality, which only adds to social complexity and thus
departing substantially from their structure or its role in implementing them. See Regula-
tory Reinvention (XL) Pilot Projects, 60 Fed. Reg. 27,282 (1995) (announcing EPA pilot
program to develop innovative alternatives to current regulatory system); Common Sense
Initiative Council Federal Advisory Committee, Establishment, 59 Fed. Reg. 55,117 (1994)
(providing notice of EPA's establishment of advisory committees to recommend
improvements in protection framework); Camilla Day Buczek, EPA Moves to Cooperative
Approach, NAT'L LJ., OcL 14, 1996, at C13; Rena I. Steinzor, Regulatory Reinvention and
Project XL Does the Emperor Have Any Clothes?, 26 ENVrL. L REP. 10,527 (1996) (reporting on
site-specific, alternative compliance programs). Industry representatives have criticized the
programs as not going far enough. See, e.g., GOP Staff Says Effort to Reinvent EPA Falls Shor,
Agency Denounces Findings, 27 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1151 (1996) (stating that executive
initiatives have failed to improve environmental policy); Concern About Common Sense
Program Prompts Michigan Officials to Withdraw, 27 Env't Rep. (BNA) 567 (1996) (noting
failure of EPA's Common Sense Initiative with Michigan authorities); 3M Decides to Drop Out
of Project XL P rcess After Disagreement Over Performance Guarantees, 27 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1045
(1996) (noting 3M's withdrawal from EPA program to avoid jeopardizing jobs and
operations). Environmentalists and environmental justice advocates contend that the
programs do not sufficiently protect their interests either. See, e.g., Concern About Common
Sense Program Prompts Michigan Officials to Withdraw, 27 Env't Rep. (BNA) 567 (1996)
(reporting that Michigan official stated that environmental justice groups were impeding
progress).
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to more inequality. Thus, inequality drives the feedback loop
between the complexity of social structure and complexity of law
and its institutions. If there is any root principle lawmakers
should stay aware of, therefore, it is to avoid increasing
inequality any more than is absolutely necessary to implement
laws that pass the muster of our first maxim of law making.
Lawmakers must be aware, also, that inequality can surface even
from good-minded laws. For example, most environmental laws
are enacted with virtuous goals in mind. Yet many commentators
contend that these laws have contributed to the stark inequality
of environmental protection the environmental justice movement
claims to exist." Law-making must seek to avoid such
results.69
The movement toward increasing use of cost-benefit analysis is
not a sufficient response in this regard. This method can be
fraught with problems that exacerbate rather than ameliorate
inequalities. 7 First, aggregate costs and benefits produced by
' See supra note 147 and accompanying text (arguing coercive regulations
disproportionately impact smaller companies). Environmental justice advocates, however,
are also concerned that market-based approaches to environmental regulation will impose
unequal benefits. See U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Office of Environmental
Justice, In the Matter of the Fifth Meeting of the National EnvironmentalJustice Advisory Counci4 9
ADMIN. L.J. 623, 695-97 (1996) (reporting that council members expressed concern
regarding the "consequences of [emissions] trading in communities of color, particularly
urban communities and low-income areas").
' Even assuming that all laws are good-minded, the problem is that we cannot know
their impacts in terms of social inequality. Presumably, society's decision to enact a law is
based on the conclusion that a provable or demonstrated truth has been identified and
that the law will make it so. See supra note 130 and accompanying text (discussing
proponents of law as tool for change). The problem in complex adaptive systems is the
infinite universe of unprovable and experimentally unverifiable, yet nonetheless valid,
truths out there just waiting to happen. See Ivars Peterson, Basins of Froth, 142 ScA. NEws
329 (1992) (discussing unknowns of dynamical systems); Ivars Peterson, Finding Riddles of
Physical Uncertainty, 144 So. NEWS 180 (1994) (discussing unpredictable result with slight
change in system's initial condition). These truths happen in society often because of the
increase in legal structure. When they do happen, they lead to stress as our assumptions,
based as they were on what we thought were provable and demonstrated truths, are proven
incomplete or just plain wrong.
"70 Amassing research indicates that in many cases, the cost of regulating toxins in the
environment and workplace has outweighed the benefit to human and environmental
welfare by many orders of magnitude. The research further indicates that in these cases,
marginal benefits of additional regulation is often infinitesimal compared to the marginal
costs. See, e.g., CENTER FOR RISK ANALYSIS, REFORM OF RISK REGULATION: ACHIEVING MORE
PROTECTION AT LESS COSr (1995); John D. Graham, Ph.D., Reform of Risk Regulation:
Achieving More Protection at Less Cost, I HUM. & ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 183 (1995)
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laws cannot be fully estimated because of the unanticipated
effects the laws will have outside of the zone of cost-benefit
study.17' Hence, cost-benefit analysis is prone to generating
inaccurate estimates of aggregate costs and benefits and thus the
potential for inequality. More importantly, however, even if ag-
gregate costs and benefits could be accurately estimated, inequal-
ity may nonetheless unexpectedly emerge if the distributional
impact of proposed laws is not explicitly measured and account-
ed for. Aggregate costs and benefits may weigh in favor of a law-
making initiative, but if the distribution of costs and benefits is
uneven, inequality grows." Finally, even when net
distributional impacts are spread evenly, cost-benefit analysis has
the tendency to exacerbate the problem of inequality simply by
(reporting that many regulations focus on minute risks and ignore much larger ones);
JOHN D. GRAHAM, NATIONAL CTR FOR POL'Y ANALYSIS, POL'Y REP. NO. 192, COMPARING
OPPORTUNITIES TO REDUCE HEALTH RISKS (1995) (arguing that toxin control spending has
wastefully diverted resources at cost of human lives). These studies have opened a vigorous
policy debate, representing many contrasting views over the role that risk-benefit analysis
should play in environmental and public health law and policy. See STEPHEN BREYER,
BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION (.1993) (discussing
problems with risk regulation and advocating more centralized coordination); RISK VERSUS
RISK (John D. Graham & Jonathan Baert Wiener eds., 1995) (advocating importance of
"risk-risk tradeoffs" in making informed policy decisions); Adam M. Finkel, A Return to
Alchemy, ENVrL. F., SepL-OcL 1996, at 15; Symposium, Risk Assessment in the Federal
Government, 3 N.Y.U. ENvr L.J. 251 (1995) (addressing current risk regulations as well as
need for future reform); Symposium, Risk Symposium, 63 U. CIN. L REV. 1533 (1995)
(discussing problems with risk assessment in formulating environmental policies); David A.
Wirth & Ellen K. Silbergeld, Risky Reform, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1857 (1995) (evaluating use of
risk assessment in policy formulation); Kenneth J. Arrow et al., Is There a Role for Benefit-Cost
Analysis in Environmental, Health, and Safety Regulation?, 272 SCI. 221 (1996) (explaining
need for cost-benefit analysis in policy evaluation). Congress has joined in the fray as well.
See, e.g., H.R. 9, 104th Cong. §§ 401-461 (1995) (passed House of Representatives March 3,
1995) (requiring federal agencies to compile risk assessment, cost-benefit analysis, and peer
review for specified major rules).
... See, e.g., Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1227 (5th Cir. 1991)
(rejecting EPA cost-benefit analysis of health risks posed by asbestos-containing products as
insufficiently precise and comprehensive).
"n Robert R. Kuehn and Cass R. Sunstein provide a comprehensive analysis of this
potential in two recent articles. See Robert R. Kuehn, The EnviromnmentaJustice Implications of
Quantitative Risk Assessmen4 1996 ILL. L. REV. 103 (comparing risk assessment with
environmental justice); Cass RL Sunstein, Conges, Constitutional Moments, and the Cost-Benefit
State, 48 STAN. L. REv. 247, 293 (1996) (indicating that cost-benefit analysis must take into
account "whether the risk is equitably distributed or concentrated on identifiable,
innocent, or traditionally disadvantaged victims").
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assigning explicit "winner" and "loser" labels to subpopulations
on discrete factors of analysis.
173
An overarching principle of all law-making, therefore, must be
to consider aggregate and distributional impacts of each law and
fashion the best law possible to achieve the most even levels,
knowing full well that there will be instances when even that
approach leads to unanticipated sources of inequality. To fully
close the loop on this second maxim, moreover, society must
apply the first maxim in those instances when inequality does
surface. That is, it should not automatically address emerging
inequality with more legal structure, but consider first whether
new law absolutely is required to address the problem.
When put into operation as a team, the first and second
maxims should apply a filtering gateway test to new additions to
the mass of laws. By embedding bias against law-making into the
philosophy and structure of law-making bodies, the first maxim
ensures that legal structure surfaces only after society deems it
necessary. By embedding distributional impact sensitivity in the
law-making process, the second maxim ensures that laws that
pass the first test add as little as possible to the social complexi-
ty-inequality feedback loop. Together these maxims may allow
society to control the increasing legal structure of the modem
administrative state.
CONCLUSION
Unless we change our direction, we are likely to end up where we are
headed. 174
The single largest threat to the modem administrative state is
itself." Complexity theory has helped us explain why. Com-
plexity theory is, however, just a theory. We propose no equa-
tions for predicting how many laws to enact or when society will
" As Yeager explains, cost-benefit analysis "outcomes tend to identify winners and
losers. Once the losers have been identified, societal notice must somehow be taken of
them." YEAGER, supra note 55, at 325. Once cost-benefit analysis is chosen as a decision-
making tool, there is a need to be precise, and the more precise it becomes the more
certain society becomes of who is winning and who is losing.
174 Chinese proverb.
175 Or, as Masters puts it, "the seeds of the decline of bureaucratic institutions lie in
their very success." MASTERS, supra note 4, at 211.
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collapse. Indeed, one of our points is that attempting to do so
would be a waste of time. History, however, is hard to ignore,
and complexity theory offers a novel analytical method for un-
derstanding why history has unfolded through a progression of
collapsing societies and what role law has played in this process.
We believe that with that analytical method we have made a
strong case for reexamining the structure and philosophy of law
making in the modem administrative state. A serious question
- one we have not attempted to bite off - is whether society
is too far down the road to change the direction in which the
modem administrative state is headed.
As Joseph Tainter says in the conclusion of his study of the
collapse of complexly structured societies, "[m]uch of the fore-
going may read like ... doom and gloom."176 The reality is,
however, that most highly successful societies of the past ended
in collapse. People are arrogant, though, and "tend to believe
that such events could only happen in history books." 77 The
modem administrative state, with all its advanced technological
and organizational apparatus, may believe that it is the pinnacle
of social development and, thus, here for the duration. Howev-
er, it has existed on this planet only a few hundred years. No
guarantees of perpetual existence come with that relatively mea-
ger accomplishment.
"6 TAINTER, supra note 4, at 123.
'77 MASfERS, supra note 4, at 212. For the view that massive social crises are a regular
and cyclical occurrence in recent history and that one is due in America very soon, see
WILIuAM STRAuss & NEIL HowE, THE FOURTH TURNING (1997).
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